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The Ninety-Second Congress has been marked by the unusual
drama of a vigorous and persistent effort by the Legislative Branch
to confront the President, eyeball to eyeball, over the primary issues
of war and peace. Nowhere has the contest been joined in a more
fundamental way, reaching to the very core of the division of powers
between the two political branches, than in the bold thrust by several
senators to codify the rules governing the circumstances in which
the United States may go to and remain in war.'
No less than 19 senators have introduced or cosponsored one of
five different bills or joint resolutions seeking to define the instances
when the President may use or deploy the Armed Forces of the United
States.' Taken singly or severally, these measures purport to demark
the sole conditions under which the President can initiate military
hostilities and to restrict his authority to continue any such hostility
beyond a brief period unless and until he has obtained a new and
specific authorization from Congress.4
* A.B. Elon College 1956; L.L.B. Duke U. 1959; Richardson Foundation
Congressional Fellowship 1959-1960; Assistant Counsel, Office of Legislative
Council, U. S. Senate 1960-1969; Legislative Counsel to U. S. Senator Barry
M. Goldwater 1969 to present.
I The Senate alone has spent parts of 61 days of Floor debate on issues
affecting the President's war making machinery in the first 143 legislative
days of the 92nd Congress. These deliberations centered primarily around
H. R. 6531, the Military Draft Extension Bill (45 days), and H. R. 8687,
the Military Procurement Authorization Act (13 days).
2 See S. 731, S. 1880, S.J. Res. 18, S.J. Res. 59, and S.J. Res. 95, all 92d
Congress, 1st Sess. (1971). But cf. H.J. Res. 1, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., passed by
the House of Representatives on August 2, 1971, in which "Congress reaffirms
its powers under the Constitution to declare war," without specifying any rules
for the conduct of military hostilities.
3Mr. Javits has introduced S. 731 for himself, Mr. Bayh, Mr. Mathias,
Mr. Packwood, Mr. Pell, Mr. Spong, Mr. Weicker and Mr. Williams. Mr.
Bentsen has introduced S. 1880 for himself and Mr. Byrd of W. Va. Mr. Taft
has introduced SJ. Res. 18. Mr. Eagleton has introduced S.J. Res. 59 for
himself, Mr. Inouye, Mr. McGovern, Mr. Montoya, and Mr. Stevenson. Mr.
Stennis has introduced S.J. Res. 95 for himself, Mr. Mansfield, and Mr. Roth.
On December 6, 1971, after this article was submitted, Senators Javits, Stennis,
Eagleton, and Spong agreed to introduce a comprehensive redraft of S. 731.
The substantive provisions of this bill, S. 2956, are essentially the same as those
in S. 731, with the addition of language borrowed from S.-J. Res. 59 pro-
viding that authority to use the Armed Forces shall not be inferred from a
treaty or appropriation act. S. 2956 was ordered favorably reported by the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations the next day, December 7.
4 See discussion pp. 2-6, infra.
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It is the purpose of this article to examine the validity of such
a legislative approach and, in so doing, to test its practical soundness.
II. DESCRIPTION OF WAR POWERS BILLS
First, it is necessary to know what the War Powers Bills
attempt to do. Accordingly, we might start by reviewing the bill, S.
731, introduced by Senator Javits. The other measures then can be
discussed in relation to how they differ from S. 731.
In its first section, the Javits bill provides that the "use of Armed
Forces of the United States in military hostilities in the absence of a
declaration of war [shall] be governed by the following rules .... "'
These rules are (1) the President shall initiate military hostilities
only in four prescribed circumstances;6 (2) the President shall report
promptly to Congress whenever military hostilities commence;' (3)
in no event shall such hostilities be sustained beyond thirty days unless
Congress enacts legislation to this end;' and (4) the President's
authority to sustain such hostilities may be terminated short of thirty
days by joint resolution of Congress.'
The four situations in which the President is limited to using the
Armed Forces are:
"1. to repel a sudden attack against the United States,
its territories, and possessions;
"2. to repel an attack against the Armed Forces of the
United States on the high seas or lawfully stationed on foreign
territory;
"3. to protect the lives and property, as may be required,
of United States nationals abroad; and
"4. to comply with a national commitment resulting ex-
clusively from affirmative action taken by the executive and
legislative branches of the United States Government through
means of a treaty, convention, or other legislative instrumentality
specifically intended to give effect to such a commitment, where
immediate military hostilities by the Armed Forces of the United
States are required.""0
5 S. 731, supra note 2, at 1, lines 3-5.
6Id. at 1-2, lines 7-13.7 Id. at 2, paragraph B, § 1.8 Id. at 2, paragraph C, § 1.
9 1d. at 2-3, paragraph D, § 1.
I I Id. at 1-2, paragraph A, § 1.
[Vol. 74
2
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 74, Iss. 1 [1971], Art. 9
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol74/iss1/9
WAR POWERS LEGISLATION
In addition, S. 731 creates a system by which legislative pro-
ceedings shall be expedited whenever a bill or resolution is introduced
continuing any military hostility initiated in one of the above four
instances or terminating any such hostility." Finally, S. 731 expressly
waives its application to hostilities undertaken before its enactment."2
By comparison, S.J. Res. 59, introduced by Senator Eagleton,
limits the President to committing U. S. forces to action only in
three of the four circumstances outlined in S. 731, omitting any
authority for the President to comply with a treaty commitment.' 3 In
fact, S.1. Res. 59 specifically mandates that no "treaty previously or
hereafter entered into by the United States shall be construed as
authorizing or requiring the Armed Forces of the United States to
engage in hostilities without further Congressional authorization."1 4
Another distinguishing feature of the Eagleton resolution is found
in its express declaration that "authorization to commit the Armed
Forces of the United States to hostilities may not be inferred from
legislative enactments, including appropriation bills which do not
specifically include such authorization."1 5
In addition, S.J. Res. 59, unlike S. 731, includes a definition of
the term "hostilities."1 6 In this way, S.J. Res. 59 not only applies to
"land, air, or naval actions, but also to the deployment of American
forces abroad "under circumstances where an imminent involvement in
combat activities with other armed forces is a reasonable possibility."1 "
United States military advisors accompanying "regular or irregular"
troops of a foreign country on any combat mission are similarly
reached by the definition. 9
If a governing Congressional authorization exists, of which the
resolution itself appears to be one, the President is authorized to
order American forces into a third country with which we are not
then engaged in hostilities when in hot pursuit of fleeing enemy forces
or when a clear and present danger exists of an imminent attack on
our forces by enemy units located in such third country.2
11 Id. at 3, § s.
11 Id. at 4, § 3.
13 S.J. Res. 59, supra note 2, pp. 4-5, § 3.
14 Id. at 2-3, § 1.
15 id. at 3, lines 9-12, § 2 (emphasis added).
161d. at 6-7, § 6.71 Id. beginning at line 25, p. 6, and ending on line 2, p. 7.
18 Id. at 7, lines 2-6.
19 Id. at 7, lines 6-11.2 I d. beginning at line 12, p. 3, and ending on line 7, p. 4, § 2.
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One remaining difference between the Javits bill and the
Eagleton resolution is the requirement in S.J. Res. 59 that the Presi-
dent shall report periodically on the status of any authorized hos-
tilities,21 rather than solely at the onset of such actions.2 2
The third War Powers legislation, S.J. Res. 95 by Senator
Stennis, is essentially similar to the provisions contained in S. J. Res.
59. The organization of sections is shifted somewhat, and Senator
Stennis explicitly adds authority for the President "to prevent or
defend against an imminent nuclear attack on the United States," 2
thereby making precise what is broadly allowed under the other
proposals. Finally, S.J. Res. 95 refers to "armed conflicts"24 instead
of "hostilities."25
But the main substantive difference between the two joint
resolutions lies in the absence from S.J. Res. 95 of an explicit
disavowal saying a national commitment cannot arise from a treaty 6
and its omission of the "hot pursuit" provision of S.J. Res. 59.2 One
change in the Stennis resolution which could become important in
different circumstances is its non-application solely to the Vietnam
conflict.28 This could mean that if war should break out at some
fresh spot in the world, the action would be within the scope of the
proposal's limitations even though it had started before the proposal
was enacted. But in the event an unexpected military venture should
develop before S.J. Res. 59 became law, the action would not be
limited by the statute. 9
S. 1880,30 introduced by Senator Bentsen, is almost identical
with S.J. Res. 95, and the above summary is adequate to describe its
provisions."
The fifth War Powers legislation is S.J. Res. 18, proposed by
Senator Taft. It is most like S. 731 in that it defines four circum-
stances similar to those of that bill in which the President is restricted
21 Id. at 5, lines 13-19, § 4.
22 See note 7, supra.
23 S.J. Res. 95, supra note 2, at 2, paragraph B, § 2.
241d. at 5-6, § 7.
25 See S.J. Res. 59, note 16 supra.
26 See S.J. Res. 59, note 14 supra.
2 7 See 5.J. Res. 59, note 20 supra.28 $J. Res. 95, supra note 2, at p. 5, § 6.
29 $.J. Res. 59, supra note 2, at p. 7, § 7. Nor would the fresh hostility
be covered by S. 731. See note 12 supra.
30 Supra note 2.
31 See text accompanying note 16 to note 29 supra.
[Vol. 74
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to using military force. 2 Unlike S. 731, however, the Taft resolution
does not restrain the period of such hostilities to thirty days. 3 Nor
does it include any procedure for the speedy consideration of legisla-
tion seeking to terminate the action.34 Furthermore, S.J. Res. 18
extends solely to situations involving the commitment of forces "to
combat,""5 while S. 731 may possibly be construed to reach a much
broader category of troop movements and uses. 6
Furthermore, S. Res. 18 does not contain any provision
exempting prior hostilities from its restrictions. 7 It does contain a
detailed part authorizing the continued deployment of United States
troops in Vietnam so long as necessary to accomplish a withdrawal
of our forces and the assumption by South Vietnam of its own de-
fense."6
III. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF WAR POWERS BILLS
A. Fundamental Issues
It is immediately evident that each of the War Powers Bills
purports to lay down rigid boundaries which supposedly will govern
the situations when the President may and may not use United States
military forces abroad."' Four of the five measures attempt to
specify for how long our troops can be committed even in the
limited situations where the President is allowed to act.
But what is the source of Congressional authority over the
decision of when and where to wage war? Does the Constitution
unequivocally deposit the controlling power over military matters
with Congress? Is there a line of court decisions clearly supporting
the view that Congress can forbid the sending of troops outside the
country? Does historical practice bear out the doctrine of Congres-
sional supremacy over the use of force in foreign affairs? Or are the
32 S.J. Res. 18, supra note 2, at 2-3, paragraph 1-4, Part I. And see
note 10 supra.
13 Cf. S. 731, supra note 8.
14 Cf. S. 731, supra note 11.
35 SJ. Res. 18, supra note 2, at 2, line 10, Part I.
36 S. 731 refers only to "military hostilities" and does not specify whether
a purpose of combat is necessary to constitute a hostility. See text accompany-
ing note 5 to note 12 supra. But cf. remarks of Senator Javits when he in-
troduced his bill in which he refers to "combat hostilities" and "combat
actions." 117 Cong. Rec. (daily ed.) S1204-S1206 (Feb. 10, 1971).3
7 Cf. S. 731, supra note 12.
38 SJ. Res. 18, supra note 2, at 3-4, Part II.
'9 See text accompanying note 5 to note 39 supra, note 40 infra.
40 Id.
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War Powers Bills founded upon misplaced emotions and unproven
postulates?
B. Textual Arguments in Support of Legislation
The task of presenting arguments for the constitutional standing
of the War Powers legislation has largely been assumed by Senator
Javits. On March 5 of this year, he inserted a thorough brief on his
bill, incorporating a discussion of the textual arguments and decided
cases, into the Congressional Record."
His brief argues that:
"Article I, Section 8 confers on Congress the major
war powers-the powers to provide for the common de-
fense; to declare war; to raise and support an army and
navy; to make rules for the government and regulation of
the land and naval forces; to provide for calling forth the
militia to execute federal laws, suppress insurrections and
repel invasions; and to provide for organizing, arming, dis-
ciplining and governing the military-and the authority to
make all laws necessary and proper to the execution of such
powers."42
From this, the brief concludes "that the role of war policy
formulation was intended for Congress and that the role of the
President was to be the faithful execution of Congressional policy."43
Thus, the executive power as Commander in Chief is seen as only a
ministerial function,44 derived from the experience of the framers of
the Constitution with the conduct of the Revolutionary War.4" Like
General George Washington, whose commission from the Continental
Congress insisted upon Congressional control of that war,4" the
4, See A Brief on S. 731, to Make Rules Respecting Military Hostilities in
the Absence of a Declaration of War, 117 Cong. Rec. (daily ed.) at 52527-
S2531 (March 5, 1971), and see Javits, supra note 36.
42 Brief, supra note 41, at S 2528.43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id. See also Javits, supra note 36, at S 1205-S 1206.
46 See exhibit 1, Javits, supra note 36, at S 1206. But cf. view of Pro-
fessor John Norton Moore that "reliance on the experience under the Articles
of Confederation seems a frail reed for interpreting a Constitution pro-
mulgated in large measure as a result of dissatisfaction with the experience
under the Articles. Hearings on War Powers Bills Before the Senate Comm.
on Foreign Relations, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), testimony of Professor
Moore inserted in the Cong. Rec. by Senator Goldwater, 117 Cong. Rec.
(daily ed.) S6469 (May 10, 1971). Moore's position applies with equal force
to the Continental Congress.
[Vol. 74
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"President, as Commander in Chief was intended to be the executive
arm of Congress, carrying out its policy directives in the prosecution
of military hostilities."
7
The concept held by Senator Javits has received support from
Professor Richard 13. Morris, who recently assured the Senate Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations "it is a fair inference from the debates on
ratification and from the learned analysis offered by the Federalist
papers that the warmaking power of the President was little more
than the power to defend against imminent invasion when Con-
gress was not in session."48
Not all commentators agree. Professor Quincy Wright wrote in
1969:
"I conclude that the Constitution and practice under
it have given the President, as Commander-in-Chief and
conductor of foreign policy, legal authority to send the
armed forces abroad; to recognize foreign states, govern-
ments, belligerency, and aggression against the United States
or a foreign state; to conduct foreign policy in a way to
invite foreign hostilities; and even to make commitments
which may require the future use of force. By the exercise
of these powers he may nullify the theoretically, exclusive
power of Congress to declare war."49
It is clear the above statement is not principally a modern day
concept, erected in awe at the vast scope of Presidential conduct over
the last twenty years." Professor W. W. Willoughby, author of a
47 Brief, supra note 41, at S 2529. The textual arguments of the Javits
brief are reminiscent of the battle Jefferson and Randolph lost to Washington
and Hamilton over the power of the President to "declare" on "the question of
war or peace." When President Washington boldly issued a proclamation of
neutrality on April 22, 1793, during the outbreak of war between France and
Great Britain, it was a clear defeat for the position argued by Jefferson that
only Congress could proclaim neutrality. To Jefferson, since Congress alone
had the power to declare war, it alone had the power to declare we were not
at war. Washington's rejection of Jefferson's narrow reasoning is generally
credited with establishing early the principle of Presidential primacy in the
making of foreign policy. See C. RossrrR, ALEXANDERHAMILTON AND THE
CONSTITUTION 84-85 (1964).
48 Hearings, supra note 46. See testimony of Professor Richard B. Morris
inserted in the Cong. Rec. by Senator Javits, 117 Cong. Rec. (daily ed.)
S3359 (March 16, 1971). And see testimony of Professor Henry Steele Com-
mager inserted in the Cong. Rec. by Senator Javits, 117 Cong. Rec. (daily ed.)
S3353-S3354. See generally Note, Congress, the President, and the Power to
Commit Forces to Combat, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1771 (1968).49 Wright, The Power of the Executive to Use Military Forces Abroad,
10 VA. J. INT'L. 54 (1969).50 Wright took the same position in 1920. See Wright, Validity of the
Proposed Reservations to the Peace Treaty, 20 CoL. L. REv. 134-36 (1920).
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famous three volume work on constitutional law, reached the same
finding in 1929. Willoughby declared that the power of the President
to send United States forces outside the country in time of peace
"when this is deemed necessary or expedient as a means of preserving
or advancing the foreign interests or relations of the United States"
is a "discertionary right constitutionally vested in him, and, therefore,
not subject to congressional control."5
The late Professor Edward Corwin, who was selected by Con-
gress to edit the congressionally sponsored Constitution Annotated, 2
also recognized the President's authority to commit military forces
abroad on his own initiative. 3 In 1944, he wrote that this power
"had developed into an undefined power-almost unchallenged from
the first and occasionally sanctified judicially-to employ without
Congressional authorization the armed forces in the protection of
American rights and interests abroad whenever necessary."54
In truth, there exists much informed opinion from which one
might doubt the restrictive view held by the advocates of War Powers
legislation.5 Contrary to the position asserted by a sponsor of one
of these bills, there is no uniform viewpoint or visible weight of
opinion establishing that "the proposals are constitutional."" 6
5' 3 W. WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES,
1567 (2d ed. 1929).5 2 E. CORWIN, CONSTITUTION ANNOTATED (1952).
53 Another well-known constitutional authority states the President "pos-
sesses the organizational authority to resort to the use of force to protect
American rights and interests abroad and to fulfill the commitments of the
nation under international agreements." B. SCHWARTZ, COMMENTARY ON THE
CONSTrUTION OF MHE UNITED STATES, Part I, Vol. II at 196 (1963).
14Corwin, Who has the Power to Make War?, N. Y. Times, July 31,
1949 at 14 (Magazine).
5 Hearings, supra note 46. See testimony of Moore at S6469-$6470;
testimony of Secretary of State William P. Rogers inserted in the Cong.
Rec. by Senator Goldwater, 117 Cong. Rec. (daily ed.) S7196-S7201 (May
18, 1971); and testimony of the Honorable George W. Ball inserted in the
Cong. Rec. by Senator Goldwater, 117 Cong. Rec. (daily ed.) S12619-S12621
(July 30, 1971).
Other recent statements recognizing full plenary power in the President
to conduct military operations are: remarks by Solicitor General Erwin N.
Griswold inserted in the Cong. Rec. by Senator Goldwater, 117 Cong. Rec.
(daily ed.) S12967-S12969 (Aug. 3, 1971); Eberhard P. Deutsch, The
President as Commander in Chief, 57 ABA J. 27-32 (Jan. 1971); Henry M.
Pachter, Reflections of Unilateral Intervention, prepared for Foreign Military
Commitments, FORENSic Q., 135-38 (May 1969); and Congress, the President,
and the War Powers, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on National Security
Policy and Scientific Developments of the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs, 91st Cong. 2d Sess. (Comm. Print 1970), testimony of Dr. W. T.
Mallison at 30-39, testimony of Professor Abram Chayes at 135-38, and
testimony of William H. Rehnquist at 210-16, 228-29, 232, and 235.
56 Spong, Can Balance be Restored in the Constitutional War Powers of
the President and Congress?, 6 U. RicH. L. Rv., at 27 (1971).
[Vol. 74
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C. Cases Used in Support of Legislation
Regardless of theoretical arguments, what have the courts de-
cided? According to the brief offered by Senator Javits, they have
held unfailingly that Congress may curb the Executive's employ-
ment of military force,5 7 a claim we shall now test.
Three of the cases relied upon by the War Powers brief construe
the application of early statutes applicable to the undeclared Naval
War of 1798 to 1800, between the United States and France. 8 In
point of fact, all of the cases were decided after the event, subsequent
to the close of hostilities and had no bearing whatsoever on the
conduct of an ongoing war.
The first of these cases, Bas v. Tingy 9 (also cited as The Eliza),
involved the factual determination of whether the term "enemy," as
used by Congress, referred to French privateers. The sole purpose of
the Court's exercise was aimed at determining whether the owner of
the Eliza had to pay salvage under a special federal law relating to the
recapture of ships from the "enemy," rather than under a general
statute which provided for payment of a much lesser amount. It is
true three justices made sweeping references to the limits which Con-
gress might set on hostilities, but these statements were in no way
necessary to the decision of the case. 0
Talbot v. Seeman,6 ' decided a year later, involved the same
statutes and included a declaration by Chief Justice Marshall to the
effect that "the whole powers of war" were "vested in Congress."62
Though heavily relied upon by sponsors of the War Powers legislation,
the decision imposed absolutely no restriction upon the Executive's
conduct of an ongoing war. What the Court would decide in the
event Congress sought to shackle the President's discretion in the
middle of an actual conflict presents a far different situation than
the minor incident settled by this case.
The third case, The Flying Fish,63 construed the meaning of a
Federal law providing for forfeiture of American vessels employed in
commerce with France. While the statute empowered American
-7 See Brief, supra note 41, at S2529-S2530.
58 See Appendix "A," infra, at 88.
594 U.S. (4 Dallas) 36 (1800).60 Id. at 39-45.
61 Also cited as The Amelia, 5 U.S. (1 Cr.) 1 (1801).
62 1d. at 28.63Also cited as Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cr.) 170 (1804).
9
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war ships to seize United States trading ships going into French
ports, President Adams directed the navy to capture United States
vessels both going into and coming from French ports. After the
war was over, the Court held the seizure of a Danish vessel upon
leaving a French port was unlawful.
Plainly the Court's discussion of the conflict between the Presi-
dential order and the Act of Congress was dictum. Neither the
President nor Congress had directed the seizure of neutral vessels.
The capture of a Danish ship was not permitted under either claim of
authority. Further, the case was not aimed at stopping the President
from using American forces. It turned on the civil obligations of the
commander of one American frigate, not on the respective roles of
Congress and the President in the making of war."
Another significant factor downgrading the relevance of the
above three cases has been raised by Professor John Norton Moore.
Speaking before the Senate hearings on War Powers legislation,
Professor Moore advised the committee "these cases involved an issue
squarely within a specific grant of authority to Congress. That is,
the power 'to make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water.'
Under the circumstances it hardly seems surprising or relevant that a
congessional act concerning rules for capture was preferred by the
Court to a presidential interpretation of that act."6"
Further question has been raised about this early line of cases by
Secretary of State William P. Rogers, who reminded the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations that they were "decided before the
doctrine of 'political questions' was formulated by Chief Justice Mar-
shall in Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829) and . . . a
similar case would probably never reach decision on the merits
today."6"
Indeed, one of the sponsors of S. 731 writes: "Also, it is con-
ceded that should war powers legislation be enacted and result in a
confrontation between the President and the Congress, there is
little chance of judicial interpretation."
6 7
64
1 d. at 179. In fact, there never has been any Supreme Court holding in
time of war which shackled the President's ability to use the forces at his
disposal to carry on that hostility. See Ratner, The Coordinated Warmaking
Power - Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Roles, 44 So. CAL. L. REv. at
486 (1971).
65 See Moore, supra note 46, at S 6469. And see U.S. Const., Art. I, 3 8.
66 See Rogers, supra note 55 at n.45, S 7201.
6 7 Spong, supra note 56, at 27. The Supreme Court has consistently
refused to tackle cases directly challenging the legality of Presidential military
decisions during an on-going war. For example, the Court has turned away
(Vol. 74
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Chronologically, the next decision relied upon in the War Powers
brief is the Prize Cases,68 a Civil War judgment regarding the legality
of President Lincoln's blockade against the Confederacy. It is claimed
this case proves "the Court's insistence upon Congressional authoriza-
tion as the basis of Presidential war powers." 9 Yet Justice Grier,
who wrote the Court's opinion, carefully explained the issue was
not whether Congress had authorized the blockade, but whether the
President, acting alone, possessed a right to take military action "on
the principles of international law, as known and acknowledged
among civilized States?"" °
In upholding President Lincoln's right to meet the insurrection,
the Court said: "If a war be made by invasion of a foreign nation,
the President is not only authorized but bound to resist force by force.
He does not initiate the war, but is bound to accept the challenge
every request for a decision on the validity of the Vietnam conflict that has
been made of it. See Berk v. Laird, 443 F. 2d 1039 (1971); cert. denied 40
U.S.L.W. 3166 (Oct. 11, 1971); Massachusetts v. Laird, motion for leave to
file complaint denied, 400 U.S. 886 (1970); Mora v. McNamara, cert. denied,
389 U.S. 934 (1967); Luftig v. McNamara, cert. denied, 387 U.S. 945 (1967);
and Mitchell v. United States, cert. denied, 386 U.S. 972 (1967).
There are earlier cases which indicate the Supreme Court will not con-
sider issues arising out of any statute purporting to regulate the President's
deployment of troops. In Mississippi v. Johnson the Court held it had no
power to restrain acts of either Congress or the President regarding the use
of troops. 71 U.S. 475 (1866). Some half century later the Court held that
the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of the power to conduct
foreign relations "is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision." Oetjen v.
Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918).
Then in 1950, the Court stated:
Certainly it is not the function of the Judiciary to entertain
private litigation-even by a citizen-which challenges the legality,
the wisdom, or the propriety of the Commander-in-Chief in sending
our armed forces abroad or to any particular region . . . The issue
tendered . . . involves a challenge to conduct of diplomatic and
foreign affairs, for which the President is exclusively responsible.
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 789 (1950).
Two recent articles which conclude the Court will not entertain the
issue of the President's war-making authority are (1) Note, The Supreme
Court as Arbitrator in the Conflict Between Presidential and Congressional
War-Making Powers, 50 BosToN U. L. REv. 78 (1970), and (2) Undeclared
War and the Right of Servicemen to Refuse Service Abroad, 10-16, Legislative
Reference Service, Library of Congress (Nov. 30, 1970). But cf. Tigar,
Judicial Power, The 'Political Question Doctrine,' and Foreign Relations,
17 U.C.L.A. L. RPv. 1135 (1970).
In light of the probable application of the "political question" doctrine
to the war powers legislation, Senator Goldwater has charged:, "[I1t may
incite one of the gravest Constitutional crises in American history." Testimony
of Senator Goldwater before Hearings on War Powers Bills, supra note 46,
inserted in 117 Cong. Rec. (daily ed.) S5637-S5647 (April 26, 1971) at S5637.
68 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863).
69 See Brief, supra note 41, at S2529.
70 Prize cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 671 (1863).
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without waiting for any special legislative authority."' In the author's
opinion, this case, far from indicating a superior role for Congress,
points to the presence of a duty on the President to answer certain
challenges against the nation without waiting for Congress to baptize
them with a name. 2
Another case cited in support of the War Powers bills is Ex parte
Milligan,3 in which the Court held that neither Congress nor the
President could authorize the trial of a civilian before a military
tribunal in a State which had been loyal to the Union during the
Civil War. Though the case did involve limits on the power of the
President, as well as on that of Congress, the Court's language might
well be read as restricting the authority of Congress to impede the
President's command of military decisions once hostilities break out.
Four of the justices remarked upon the power of Congress in time of
war as follows: "This power necessarily extends to all legislation
essential to the prosecution of war with vigor and success, except
such as interferes with the command of the forces and the conduct of
campaigns. That power and duty belong to the President as com-
mander-in-chief." 4
Another case which may actually enlarge upon the President's
power, but has been cited as authority for the War Powers legisla-
tion,7" is United States v. Midwest Oil Company.76 This case con-
sidered the validity of a Presidential decree which withdrew from
private acquisition all public lands containing petroleum. The Presi-
dent had issued the order even though Congress had passed a law
making these same lands free and open to purchase by United States
citizens.
77
Nevertheless, the Court found that the Executive had been
making similar orders contrary to Acts of Congress for a long time
71 Id. at 668.
72 Professor Schwartz claims: "The language of the high Court in the
Prize Cases is broad enough to empower the President to do much more than
merely parry a blow already struck against the nation. Properly construed, in
truth, it constitutes juristic justification of the many instances in our history
(ranging from Jefferson's dispatch of a naval squadron to the Barbary Coast
to the 1962 blockage of Cuba) in which the President has ordered belligerent
measures abroad without a state of war having been declared by Congress."
B. ScuwATz, Tm RE Ns OF PoweR at 98 (1963). And see text accompanying
note 114 to note 149 infra.
73 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).74
1d. at 139.
71 See Brief, supra note 41, at S 2530.
76236 U.S. 459 (1915).
77 Id. at 466-67.
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and, as a result, had acquired a power to do what it had been doing.7"
As we shall see in a later part of this article, the Midwest doctrine
may thereby be applicable to support the practice of Presidents to
commit United States troops overseas without Congressional direc-
tion.7 9
The remaining decision relied on in the War Powers brief is the
"Steel Seizure"80 case which arose out of President Truman's at-
tempted takeover of the nation's major steel mills. Though the Court
held, six to three, the President lacked authority on his own to take
possession of private property, even on the ground of his role as
Commander in Chief, it is plain the Court's majority treated the case
as a domestic issue far removed from matters of day-to-day fighting in
a theater of war.8
Justice Jackson appears to have expressed the mood of the
Court aptly when he wrote:
"We should not use this occasion to 'circumscribe,'
much less to contract, the lawful role of the President as
Commander-in-Chief. I should indulge the widest latitude
of interpretation to sustain his exclusive function to com-
mand the instruments of national force, at least when
turned against the outside world for the security of our
society.""2
Accordingly, it is believed the "Steel Seizure" case is mistakenly
cited as being applicable to any situation regarding the use of United
States troops outside the country for the protection of American
interests. In the words of Secretary of State William P. Rogers, "the
precise issue in that case was not the President's authority to conduct
hostilities but the scope of his power over a clearly domestic matter
-labor management relations."83
A somewhat analogous decision, inspiring a multitude of
opinions and touching on the fringes of the President's War Powers,
with no direct limit on his right to deploy forces, is the New York
Times case84 relating to the publication of the so-called Pentagon
7 8 1d. at 460-70, 474.
79 See text accompanying note 142 to note 149 infra.80 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
81 Id. at 587.812Id. at 645.
8 3 See Rogers, supra note 55, at S 7198.
84 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
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Papers. In this case, Justice Douglas, joined by Justice Black, aimed
a thrust at the President by proclaiming "[n]owhere are presidential
wars authorized."85 But this view was not taken up by any other
member of the Court's majority, nor is it decisive of the Court's
ruling.
D. Source of President's Powers over Military and Foreign Affairs
Numerous authorities have described in detail the vast scope of
the President's authority to employ force abroad.8" In general, these
observers point to four distinct powers of the President as the root of
his independent authority. The powers are centered in his acquisition
of all the "Executive Power" of a great and sovereign nation, 7 in
his mandate to initiate and conduct foreign policy,"8 in his right and
duty to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed," 9 and in his
designation as Commander in Chief."'
The very first sentence of article II of the Constitution reads:
"The Executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United
States of America."9' As Solicitor General Erwin Griswold has
recently noted, the grant of Executive power "is not a merely passive
grant."92
It was Alexander Hamilton who first used this grant in arguing
that the President's role in international matters is a positive one.9
In fact, Hamilton claimed this clause had vested in the President the
inherent powers held by any sovereign nation, including the right to
form policy which "may, in its consequences, affect the exercise of
the power of the Legislature to declare war."94 The Hamiltonian
concept of inherent powers over foreign affairs appears to have
influenced Chief Justice John Marshall, who in 1800 while still a
Member of the House of Representatives, conceived the familiar
quote: "The President is the sole organ of the nation in its external
relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations."95
85 Id. at 722.
86 See text accompanying note 49 to note 56 supra pp. 8-9. And see note
55 supra.8 7 E. CORWIN, PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 220 (3d rev. ed. 1948).
88 See text accompanying note 96 to note 100 infra.
89 See text accompanying note 101 to note 108 infra.
90 See text accompanying note 110 to note 113 infra.
91 U.S. CONST., Art. I, § 1.
92 Griswold, supra note 55, at S 12968.
93 See CORWIN, supra note 87, at 217-20.
94 Cited in CoRWIN, supra note 87, at 218.
11 ANALS, 6th Cong., col. 613 (1800).
[Vol. 74
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In 1971, Justice Harlan, Chief Justice Burger, and Justice
Blackmun breathed fresh life into Marshall's characterization by
writing: "From that time, shortly after the founding of the Nation,
to this, there has been no substantial challenge to this description of
the scope of executive power." 6  The reference by these three
justices to the President's "constitutional primacy in the field of
foreign affairs" was echoed in the same case by Justice Thurgood
Marshall who declared: "[lit is beyond cavil that the President
has broad powers by virtue of his primary responsibility for the con-
duct of our foreign affairs and his position as Commander-in-Chief." 7
All four justices cited with approval98 the landmark case of
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,99 in which the Supreme
Court had embraced the doctrine of "inherent" powers over the
conduct of foreign affairs. There the nation's highest tribunal held it
was dealing with "the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of
the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field
of international relations-a power which does not require as a basis
for its exercise an act of Congress . ... 0
The third pertinent power of the President is derived from his
duty and right to execute the laws, an implicit authority which often
is overlooked in contemporary discussions of the war powers. Pro-
fessor Quincy Wright has remarked on this authority:
The duty to execute the laws is not limited to the
enforcement of acts of Congress and treaties of the United
States, but includes also "the rights, duties and obligations
growing out of the constitution itself, our international
relations, and all the protection implied by the nature of the
government under the constitution."''
Corwin has described the implications of this doctrine as fol-
lows:
Thanks to the same capacity to base action directly
on his own reading of international law-a capacity which
96 New York Times Co. v United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) supra
note 84, at 756. And see separate dissent by Justice Blackmun at 761.9 7 1d. at 741.
981 d. at 741-42, 756.
99 299 U.S. 304 (1936).100 d at 319-20.
1o Wright, supra note 50, at 134-35.
And see In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 64 (1889), cited by Wright in discussion.
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the Court recognized in the Neagle case-the President
has been able to gather to himself powers with respect to
warmaking which ill accord with the specific delegation in
the Constitution of the war-declaring power to Congress."°2
Thus, the implied power of the President to interpret for himself
the scope of our international obligations has enabled him to
validly exercise powers which might otherwise appear to have been
left to the proper authority of Congress.' 3
It has also been judicially determined that "the President's duty
to execute the laws includes a duty to protect citizens abroad .... "'
Thus said Justice Nelson, who sitting as a district judge in 1880 up-
held the authority of the President to take whatever action he deter-
mines proper to protect "the lives, liberty, and property" of the citizen
abroad, without awaiting word from Congress.'05 The corollary right
of a citizen abroad "to demand the care and protection of the Federal
government over his life, liberty, and property" was subsequently
recognized by the Supreme Court,' 6 which expressly included this
protection among the privileges and immunities of citizenship
guaranteed by the Constitution."
Not only is there persuasive domestic law on the issue of inter-
vention abroad for the protection of citizens, but J. Reuben Clark,
citing several international authorities, claims:
There is considerable authority for the proposition
that such interposition by one state in the internal affairs
of another state for the purpose of affording adequate pro-
I 2 E. CoRwiN, supra note 87, at 240-41.
103 Corwin has also written:
But the President may also make himself the direct administrator
of the international rights and duties of the United States, or of
what are adjudged by him to be such, without awaiting action either
by the treaty-making power or by Congress, or by the courts. Id.
at 239.
W. Willoughby observed:
It is also to be noted that the powers constitutionally vested in the
President with regard to the control of the foreign relations of the
United States makes it possible for him to bring about a situation in
which, as a practical proposition, there is little option left to Congress
as to whether it will or will not declare war or recognize a state of
war as existing. W. WILLOUGHBY, supra note 51, at 1558.
1
0 4 See Q. WRIGHT, Ti CONTROL OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS
306 (1922); Durand v. Hollins, 8 F. Cas. 111 (4 Blatch 451, CCSD NY 1860).
,05 Durand v Hollins at 454.
106 See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 79 (1872).
107 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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tection to the citizens of one resident in the other as well as
for the protection of the property of such citizens, is not only
not improper, but, on the contrary, is based upon, is in
accord with, and is the exercise of a right recognized by
international law. 08
In addition, the right of the nation to defend itself, as well as its
citizens, is clearly established in both international and domestic
law.'0
9
A fourth source of the President's powers in the field of war
making rests upon his designation as Commander in Chief." ' This
power has been succinctly defined to encompass "the conduct of all
military operations in time of peace and of war, thus embracing
control of 'the disposition of troops, the direction of vessels of war
and the planning and execution of campaigns," and to be "exclusive
and independent of Congressional power.""I
What little judicial holdings there are on this power suggest it
is largely an unfettered one. For example, in 1866, the Supreme
Court pointedly stated: "Congress cannot direct the conduct of
campaigns. '  In 1897, the High Court affirmed a decision by the
Court of Claims which held: "Congress cannot in the disguise of
'rules for the government' of the Army impair the authority of the
President as Commander in Chief.""' 3
E. Historical Overview of President's War Powers
Some twenty-five years ago, James Rogers, a former Assistant
Secretary of State wrote: "It must be evident that the control of
foreign policy and of the armed forces left to the President by the
108 J. CLARK, RIGHT TO PRoTEcT CiTIZBNS IN FoRIGN CouNTRIEs BY
LANDING FORcEs, 25 (3d rev. ed. with supp. appendix up to 1933: 1934).
,09 See Q. WRIGHT, supra note 104, at 307; Spong, supra note 56, at 24;
Moore, The Lawfulness of Military Assistance to the Republic of Viet-Nam,
The Vietnam War and International Law; Am. Soc'Y OF INT'L L. 237 (1968);
id. at 583-603; Memorandum by U. S. Dept. of State, The Legality of United
States Participation in the Defense of Viet-Nam, (March 4, 1966); B.
SCHwARTZ, supra note 72, at 175.
0 U.S. CONST. art. If, § 2, cls. 1.
11 Q. WRIGHT, supra note 50, at 134; W. WILLOUGHBY, note 51 supra, at1567. 12 Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall) 2 at 139. See also holding by
Court of Claims that "In time of war, the Commander in Chief has the
same powers as other civilized governments, and the exercise of them needed
no ratification to give them effective force." The Court was speaking of the
undeclared war in the Philippines. Warner, Barnes and Co. v. United States,
40 Ct. Cl. 1, 32 (1904).
"13 Swaim v. United States, 28 Ct. Cl. 173, 221, affd 165 U.S. 553
(1897).
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Constitution and reinforced by a century and half of augmentation,
reduces the reservation of the power to 'declare war' to a mechanical
step, sometimes even omitted.""' What had happened to allow
Rogers to assert such a bold claim? It was his discovery, unknown
and unnoticed by most Americans, that "[t]he Executive has used
force abroad at least a hundred times to accomplish national purposes
without reference to Congress."" 5
This astonishing total was evaluated by Professor Corwin, who
stated: "While inviting some pruning, the list demonstrates beyond
peradventure the power of the President, as Chief Executive and
Commander in Chief, to judge whether a situation requires the use
of available forces to support American rights abroad and to take
action in accordance with that decision."
' 16
Clearly "little wars are not a phenomena new to the national
experience,"'"7 as some authorities, obsessed by the Vietnam war,
would have us believe." ' Indeed, by April of 1971, Senator Barry
Goldwater informed the Senate War Powers hearing that research at
his direction had "turned up 153 such actions.""' 9 The Goldwater
study is a continuing one and a fresh review of the subject by the
author in preparation for future testimony by Senator Goldwater
reveals there are at least 192.20 separate military engagements
initiated by the Executive branch without a declaration of war from
1798 to 1971."'
The list seems particularly imposing since its total consists of
hostilities where actual fighting took place, landings were made on
foreign soil, or United States citizens were evacuated. No precedents
are listed involving mere deployment of forces or draft simply to
maintain an American presence, even if the deployment constituted an
14 J. ROGERS, WORLD POLICING AND THE CONSTITUTION 55 (1945).
"151d. at 56.
116 E. CORWIN, supra note 54, at 14.
"7 See R. DuruY AND W. BAt-MER, THE LITTLE WARS OF THE UNITED
STATES preface (1968).
118 See, e.g., Commager, supra note 48, principally at S 3355, and Morris,
supra note 48, at S 3359.
19 See Goldwater, supra note 67, at S 5637.
120 See appendix A infra.
121 Other itemized lists of U.S. military operations abroad are: J CLARK,
supra note 108, at 51-130 (78 incidents without declarations of war and not
later disavowed or repudiated); J. ROGERS, supra note 114, at 93-123 (139 such
incidents); State, infra appendix A at 36 (135 such incidents); and Legislative
Reference Service, Library of Congress, Background Information on the Use of
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alert accompanied by an advanced state of readiness, except for some
eight instances in which the risk of war was particularly grave. Nor
have any military operations been offered as precedents which were
subsequently disavowed or repudiated by the Executive.'22
Are these precedents "minor undertakings"' and "short-
lived" 24 as charged by some critics? Are the incidents confined to
the Western Hemisphere and contiguous territory up to "the last
twenty years or so," with the solo exception of the Boxer Expedition,
as claimed by Henry Steele Commager? '2 The author believes the
record stands for itself. We might note first that out of the 192
actions listed, 100 occurred outside the Western Hemisphere,'26
85 of them taking place before "the last twenty years or so. "1 ' To
which fact, we might add that 81 hostilities constituted actual combat
operations or ultimatums tantamount to the use of force.' 8
Ninety-three engagements continued for longer than 30 days.'2 9
No more than 81 of the precedents,' less than half, could arguably
have been initiated with the support of a legislative instrumentality.
At least 43 of the precedents'.' were "calculated and ideological"' 32
in the sense that they committed the United States outside its own
territory in order to advance major, long-range national interests
stretching far beyond the immediate protection of its citizens or
territory.
Were the operations minor? In 1854, at a time when American
forces did not exceed 50,000 men, Commodore Perry took 2,000
of them to the other side of the world in order to pressure Japan
into reaching a commercial treaty with us.' 3 Between 1899 and
1901, the United States used 126,468 troops to put down the
Philippine Insurrection. "'
122 See appendix A infra, note 3 at 110.
123 Reveley, Presidential War-Making: Constitutional Prerogative or
Usurpation?, 55 VA. L. REv. 1258 (1969).
124 Malawer, The Vietnam War Under the Constitution: Legal Issues
Involved in the United States Military Involvement in Vietnam, 31 U. Prrr.
L. REv. 213 (1969).




128 See appendix D infra at 114.
129 See appendix E infra at 115.
'
3 1 See appendix G infra at 117.
'1 See appendix C infra at 112.
1
3 2 See Commager, supra note 48, at 83355.
133 See appendix A infra at 92.
134 Id. at 98.
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After World War I had ended, we landed 5,000 soldiers at
Archangel, Russia, and 9,000 more in Siberia, to aid the anti-
Bolsheviks and to forestall Japanese expansionist plans in Siberia."3 5
From 1926 to 1933, United States Marines fought more than 150
battles in Nicaragua and lost 97 men in seeking to foil what has
been referred to as the "first attempt of Communism to infiltrate
Latin America."'
In 1927, the United States had 6,000 troops ashore in China
and 44 naval vessels in its waters. '37 In numerous other instances,
the United States has put ashore hundreds and even thousands of
forces on foreign lands. '38
Put in the perspective of their own times, it is believed these
interventions cannot be classified as "minor." Rather, the author
would agree with the assessment of Professor Henry Monaghan that:
[Wlith ever-increasing frequency, presidents have em-
ployed that amount of force that they deemed necessary to
accomplish their foreign policy objectives. When little force
was needed (e.g., in our incursions in Latin America), little
was used; when larger commitments were necessary, they
too were forthcoming. Whatever the intention of the
framers, the military machine has become simply an instru-
ment for the achievement of foreign policy goals, which,
in turn, have become a central responsibility of the pre-
sidency.' 39
Further, the author believes Professor Monaghan is correct in
telling us that "history has legitimated the practice of presidential
war-making." ' In Monaghafs words, "A practice so deeply em-
bedded in our governmental structure should be treated as decisive
of the Constitutional issue."14 '
With this historical record in back of us, the principle laid down
by the Supreme Court in Midwest Oil'4 gains added relevance. Here




,'6 Id. at 103. See R. DuPUY AND W. BAUMER, supra note 117 at 168.




9 Monaghan, Presidential War-Making, 50 BOSTON U. L. REv. 27 (1970).
14 0 1d. at 29.
141 Id. at 31. See generally Griswold, supra note 55.
142 United States v Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915).
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statute or the existence of a power, weight shall be given to the usage
itself-even when the validity of the practice is the subject of in-
vestigation."''
Certainly, the deployment of forces abroad on the initiative of
the President alone is a "long-continued practice" extending backward
far longer than the usage found to be valid in the Midwest Oil case. 4
Furthermore, Congress has known of and acquiesced in the Presidenfs
usage for nearly a century and a half now, part of the time arguably
in the face of a limiting Congressional statute.'45
One instance when it is clear the President violated the terms
of a Congressional statute attempting to govern his power to deploy
troops abroad is the experience of the nation under the Selective
Service Act of 1940. '46 The law expressly provided that no draftees
1
431d. at 473.
144 Presidents had issued orders withdrawing public lands from private
acquisition over a period of 80 years. Id. at 469. In comparison, Presidents
have been sending troops abroad on their own initiative for more than a
century and a half. See appendix A infra generally.
1 The statute reads in pertinent part:
"From and after the passage of this act it shall not be lawful to
employ any part of the Army of the United States, as a posse
comitatus, or otherwise, for the purpose of executing the laws, except
in such cases and under such circumstances as such employment of
said force may be expressly authorized by the Constitution or by act
of Congress . . ." (Emphasis added.) H. R. 4867, approved June
18, 1878, § 15 (45th Cong.) 20 Stat. 152.
It is true the law was aimed primarily at the use of troops in suppressing
domestic violence or insurrection, but on its face it extends to all use of the
Army, without any geographical limitation, for the purpose of executing
the laws. As we have seen, the President's right to execute the laws includes
a power to enforce international obligations as well as domestic laws. See
discussion supra pp. 17-18.
Furthermore, it was evident to Congress the law it was debating would
be applicable to circumstances much broader than the posse comitatus
situation described in the act. Members of both Houses indicated their
awareness of the provision's reach to situations involving the employment of
troops against foreign dangers. See remarks of Senator Matthews where
he speaks of "foreign wars" 7 Cong. Rec. 4297 (1878) and remarks of
Senator Hoar, id. at 4303. One proposed amendment, introduced and
defeated during floor debate in the House of Representatives, would have
exempted from the law the use of forces "on the Mexican border or in the
execution of the neutrality laws elsewhere on the national boundary lines."
Id. at 3849.
In these circumstances and in view of the broad language of the statute,
the author believes it can reasonably be interpreted as purporting to limit the
use of the Army in the international theater as well as the domestic one.
Thereby the doctrine of constitutional interpretation announced in Midwest Oil
would suarely provide additional support buttressing the legality of the
Presidents use of troops abroad. Section 15 of H. R. 4867 was repealed in
1956 and restated in broader form as the new section 1385 of title 18, U.S.C.
(70 A Stat. 626).
146 54 Stat. 885.
21
Emerson: War Powers Legislation
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1971
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
were to be employed beyond the limits of the Western Hemisphere,
except in territories and possessions of the United States.' 4'
Notwithstanding the Congressional prohibition, President Roose-
velt deployed our troops, including draftees, to occupy Iceland and
Greenland several months before World War II had been declared.'
8
Iceland, however, is over 2,300 miles away from the closest point in
the United States and is invariably placed in the section on Europe
in any prominent world atlas. If nothing more, the incident shows
Presidents will ignore Congressional limitations when they believe
vital American interests are undeniably at stake.'49
IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Regardless of the legality or illegality of the War Powers legisla-
tion, are the measures wise or proper from a practical standpoint?
Can any Member of Congress, or Congress collectively, foresee all
contingencies that may arise in the future? Might the War Powers
legislation unwittingly turn the tables on its sponsors by exciting a
situation or pushing a reluctant President into broader action than
he wishes? A partial answer might be evident from the fact that
many of the same authorities who have testified in favor of the
general concept of War Powers legislation nevertheless have uttered
grave concerns about the wisdom of these measures in practice.
For example, McGeorge Bundy warned "no single rule is likely
to meet all our needs, and in particular I think it is dangerous to try to
deal with the future by legislating against the past."'50 Alexander
Bickel has confessed: "Codification seems to me difficult, heavily
14' Id. § 3(e), at 886. Congressional debate on the 1940 Selective Service
law shows that when Congress referred to the "Western Hemisphere" it
definitely meant only that area of North, Central, and South America which
"we have long engaged to protect under the Monroe Doctrine."
The provision is also an unlikely precedent for War Powers legislation
because its author, Senator Lodge, conceded on the Senate Floor, "This is a
pious hope." It was openly recognized by him and others that Congress could
not constitutionally restrict the President's deployment of forces. See 86 Cong.
Rec. 10092, 10103, 10105, 10116, 10129, 10295, 10391, 10742, 10794-10798,
and especially 10895-10914, 76th Cong. 3d Sess. (1940).
141 See appendix A infra at 105.
141 Corwin also argues the U.S. agreement to turn over 50 reconditioned
destroyers to Britain in 1940 "was directly violative of at least two statutes
.... " E. CoRwiN, supra note 87 at 288-89. And see appendix A infra at -,
and Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, S. Rep. No. 797, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. (1969) 14-15.
150 See testimony of McGeorge Bundy, Congress, the President, and the
War Powers, supra note 55, at 3.
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prone to error, quite possibly dangerous, and unnecessary.""' Wil-
liam D. Rogers remarked: 'I think the Javits proposal requiring
the President in effect to get out if Congress does not act within 30
days is dangerous."15
These thoughts have been refined and expanded by others who
are in outright opposition to passage of War Powers legislation.'5 3
Secretary of State William P. Rogers cautioned those who might
conceive of the War Powers legislation as serving the end of peace
by saying: "Moreover, requiring prior congressional authorization
for deployment of forces can deprive the President of a valuable
instrument of diplomacy which is used most often to calm a crisis
rather than enflame it."l
4
To which he added:
"There is another consideration. To circumscribe
presidential ability to act in emergency situations-or even
to appear to weaken it-would run the grave risk of mis-
calculation by a potential enemy regarding the ability of
the United States to act in a crisis. This might embolden
such a nation to provoke crises or take other actions which
undermine international peace and security."' 5
Professor James MacGregor Burns, the recipient of a Pulitzer
Prize for his skills as a political historian, has gone further. He has
testified that any legislation which would encumber the President's
ability to respond and adjust to changing world situations as he
determines proper will remove the one essential ingredient preventing
World War III-flexibility.'56 Dr. Bums warned that imposing artifi-
cial restrictions on Executive discretion "may not lead to peace but to
war, as foreign adversaries estimate that the United States will not
151 See testimony of Alexander Bickel, Congress, the President, and the
War Powers, supra note 55, at 45.
152 See testimony of Attorney William D. Rogers, Congress, the President,
and the War Powers, supra note 55, at 58.
IS3 See testimony of Professor Abram Chayes, who supports legislative
efforts to end the Indochina War, but nevertheless vigorously opposes as
unconstitutional "bills that seek to lay out a detailed blueprint in advance to
govern the relations between the President and the Congress in the exercise
of the national war power in all possible contingencies." Congress, the Presi-
dent, and the War Powers, supra note 55, at 135.
.54 Rogers, supra note 55, at S 7199.
155 Id.
1S6 See testimony of Dr. James MacGregor Burns, Congress, the President,
and the War Powers, supra note 55, at 81-82.
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respond to a threat to world peace because of legislative restrictions
on the executive."'57
The fear expressed by Dr. Bums was recently taken up by
former Under Secretary of State George W. Ball, who is credited with
being a dove in the high ranks of the Johnson Administration. Mr.
Ball reminds us that the Neutrality Acts adopted in the aftermath of
World War I "very probably" impeded the United States from taking
firm steps which would have averted World War II. '58 This illustra-
tion leads Mr. Ball to ask how does one draft a statute that will make
it possible for Congress to play a role "in shaping fundamental deci-
sions that may lead to war without inhibiting the President in doing
whatever is necessary" to avert some future catastrope parallel to
World War II.'"
Senator Barry Goldwater sounded the same alarm in his ap-
pearance before the War Powers hearings. He charged the legisla-
tion "will undermine the credibility of our most basic defense agree-
ments such as NATO. With one swipe, our 42 defense pacts will
be chopped into 30-day wonders, if that."'60
Senator Goldwater argued: "Thereby, the proposed bill will
place all our treaty obligations in a state of permanent doubt. No
ally can ever know if the United States will stand by it for more
than 30 days; and even then, it cannot be certain whether Congress
will shut off our aid sooner."' 6 ' But there is another side to the coin.
If Congress has the right to legislate concerning the rules of war as is
argued by the sponsors of War Powers legislation,' 62 Congress also
possesses the power to order the President into broader hostilities
than he wishes. This development could actually occur under a
15 Id. Consider the observation of former Ambassador Charles W.
Thayer, that:
It was due largely to the erratic, occasionally irresponsible
actions of the ancient Greek assemblies that the city-states' diplomacy
was ineffective and defensive collaboration against the Eastern
aggressors impossible. Despite growing recognition by Congress and
the public of the purpose, methods and needs of an effective di-
plomacy, so long as the consistent pursuit of long-range interests and
aspirations is periodically sacrificed to passing whims inspired by
fleeting emotions in Washington, the danger persists of a twentieth
century repetition of the Greek debacle. W. THAYER, DIPLOMAT 80
(1959).
,5 8 See Ball, supra note 55, at S 12621.
159 Id.
' 60 Goldwater, supra note 67, at S 5637.
161 Id.
'
62 See generally Brief, supra note 41.
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provision of these bills in their present form which establishes a
procedure for expedited consideration by Congress of legislation
designed to sustain hostilities beyond 30 days.'63
The danger can be tested against actual history. For example, if
the War Power legislation had been in effect at the time of the
Cuban missile crisis,' 64 Congress would have been required to act
swiftly on the matter of continuing the deployment of forces in the
Caribbean once the 30-day period possibly allowed by the legislation
had expired. Under the telescoped parliamentary procedure created
by the legislation, this vote likely would have occurred (Congress then
having been in session) within a matter of a few days. Thus, Congress
would have voted right at the peak of emotional excitement and
public concern over the missile threat.
One can easily suppose in the setting of the time-with enemy
missiles being aimed at cities holding 80 million American citizens,
with reports arriving of attacks on American reconnaissance planes,
and with the killing of an American pilot over Cuba' 65-that a
majority in Congress, with one eye on elections only weeks away,
would have favored legislation directing an all-out bombardment of
Cuba or even an invasion.
As Senator Goldwater observed: "Those who look to Congress
as the ultimate haven of peaceful thinking might thumb through the
pages of Robert Kennedy's short manuscript on the Cuban Missile
Crises."' 66 In this book, the late Senator Kennedy recounts that of
all the deliberations which preceded his brother's broadcast to the
nation on the crisis, his session with the leaders of Congress "was
the most difficult meeting."'6'
According to Robert Kennedy:
Many Congressional leaders were sharp in their criti-
cism. They felt the President should take more forceful
action, a military attack or invasion, and that the blockade
was far too weak a response. Senator Richard B. Russell of
Georgia said he could not live with himself if he did not say
in the strongest possible terms how important it was that we
163 See generally text accompanying note 10 to note 36 supra. And see
S. 731, §2; S. 1880, §4; S.J. Res. 59, §4; and S.1. Res. 95, § 4, all supra note 2.
164 See appendix A inra at 107.
'
6"See R. KENNEDY, TaImTEEN DAYS (1969) at 35, 36, 68, 97, and 107.
1
66 Goldwater, supra note 67, at S 5638.
16
7 KENNEDY, supra note 165, at 53.
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act with greater strength than the President was contem-
plating.
Senator J. William Fulbright of Arkansas also strongly
advised military action rather than such a weak step as the
blockade. '68
In light of this illustration, Senator Goldwater asks: "Is it not
possible Congress might, when confronted with dramatic pressure for
making an immediate decision, vote in favor of a military strike?
Are the Members of Congress more immune to emotional, im-
pulsive reactions than other humans?" 69
In the event Congress should decide to steer our nation into ex-
panded hostilities, the authors of War Powers legislation would
leave the President no exit. Their whole argument for the power
of Congress to pass such legislation is squarely based upon the
proposition that Congress controls the War Powers and that the
President must faithfully carry out the directives enacted by Con-
gress. 7' According to the brief offered by Senator Javits, "the
President has no right to contravene such legislation."' ,"
There is another problem. What about the ability of the Presi-
dent to respond to specific, sudden emergencies? Is the assurance
of Irving Brant correct that the War Powers legislation "does not
interfere in the least with the handling of any emergency, from minor
property damage to nuclear holocaust?" 7'
168 Id. at 53-54.
169 Goldwater, supra note 67, at S 5638.
'
7 0 See generally testimony of Commager and Morris, supra note 48;
testimony of Professor Alexander Bickel, inserted in the Cong. Rec. by Senator
Javits, 117 Cong. Rec. (daily ed.) S 12387 (July 28, 1971). See generally,
Brief, supra note 41.
171 See Brief, supra note 41, at S 2528. In case the President should veto
any such legislation shoving him into an expanded war, he would be put in the
unenviable position of facing a Congress which (1) would likely claim he had
thereby deprived himself of any authority to act at all in the hostility concerned
and (2) could vote to override his veto.
172 Brant, Nixon vs. Constitution in War Powers Debate, The Washing-
ton Post, July 4, 1971, at B-3.
Compare the position of Ambassador Thayer, who views the Foreign
Service dangerously handicapped under present Congressional practices, let
alone under the complications added by War Powers legislation. For example
Thayer recites:
In his Memoirs, President Truman indicates how the Greek Civil
War was very nearly lost to the Communists because of the time
needed to get the necessary Congressional action.
The first warning that the British, then on the verge of bank-
ruptcy, would have to withdraw from Greece not later than April 1,
1946, was telephoned to the President by the State Department on
[Vol. 74
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Perhaps reference to some actual situations will provide an
answer. Oddly enough, the proposal introduced by a Senator from
New York, himself Jewish, as well as the other War Powers legisla-
tion, would prohibit the United States from acting to defend the
state of Israel. This result occurs because under the Javits bill, the
President may act to comply with a national commitment only if
the commitment results exclusively from a "legislative instrumentality
specifically intended to give effect to such a commitment .... V173
But this country has no legislative commitment to defend the
security of Israel. There is no treaty or convention or resolution
authorizing the United States to assist in preserving Israers inde-
pendence. ' Senator Goldwater has set the scene:
Friday, February 21. Four days later Congressional leaders were
notified that some sort of action would be essential. But it was
not until seventy-five days later, that the House on May 9, finally
approved the measure. Meantime the Communist guerrillas had
almost succeeded in overthrowing the Greek government. C. W.
THAYER, supra note 157, at 78-79.
173 S. 731, supra note 2, at § IA (4).
174 Secretary of State Rogers contends "such a restriction could seriously
limit the ability of the President to make a demonstration of force . . . to
deploy elements of the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean in connection with
the Middle East situation," which is exactly what President Johnson did in
1967. See Rogers, supra note 55, at S7199, and see discussion infra pp. 32-33;
Moore, supra note 46, at S6470; S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, note 149,
at 26.
Representative Zablocki, Chairman of the House Subcommittee hearings
on war powers in 1970, told Senator Javits during the latter's appearance at
the hearings: "Let us say that as a result of renewed hostilities in the Middle
East the President finds it necessary to intervene on the side of Israel. Your
bill does not seem to fit that contingency since the United States has no
formal treaty or pact with Israel."
Senator Javits replied: "I would hope that long before any such terribly
untoward situation would develop in the Middle East . . . this would have
been adopted as a NATO responsibility and then it would come under the
fourth item of my own bill." See Congress, the President, and the War
Powers, supra note 55, at 400-401.
Thus, from Senator lavits' own admission the President could not act
independently in defense of the people of Israel under his bill, but would have
to await either a decision by NATO to take collective action in support of
Israel (no one else has suggested Israel is a NATO obligation) or legislative
action by Congress.
No authority considers the Middle East Resolution to be pertinent,
apparently because it (1) does not grant any authority to employ force,
but simply states a policy that "the United States is prepared to use armed
forces," (2) does not apply unless the aggressor country is "controlled by
international communism,' and (3) provides the employment of force "shall
be consonant with the treaty obligations of the United States" and we do not
have any defense treaty with Israel. Pub. Law 85-7, a joint resolution to pro-
mote peace and stability in the Middle East, approved March 9, 1957 (71
Stat. 5).
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No matter that Arab fanatics may be seeking to make
good on their aim of shoving the Israelis into the sea. No
matter that approximately 20,000 Soviet personnel may be
manning SA-3 missile sites and advanced jet fighters while
massive Egyptian tank forces mount an invasion on disputed
Sinai territory . . . . Regardless of the humanitarian exi-
gencies and the dire consequences on European security, the
War Powers Bill prohibits an immediate response by the
United States to forestall an Arab conquest of Israel."7 5
Senator Goldwater has added:
Oh yes, we might rush in Air Force transport planes to
whisk our own citizens out of danger. We might even send
a contingent of marines into cities where our embassies and
legations are located to aid them.
But when our forces are called upon to act for broader
purposes-for reasons of vital strategic interests such as
saving another nation's people from annihilation-the war
powers bill will halt our forces short. This would be
carrying out a national commitment.' 6
Nor is the scenario described by Senator Goldwater an implausible
one. The United States has already intervened once in the Arab-
Israeli crisis in a way that would be specifically curbed under any
of the pending War Powers legislation.' 7 This incident occurred in
June of 1967, during the six-day Middle East war, after President
Johnson had heard over the hotline that Russia "had reached a
decision that they were prepared to do what was necessary, in-
cluding using the military" to stop the advance of Israeli troops into
Arab territory.' 78
As President Johnson understood it at the time "unless the
Israelis halt operations within the next five hours the Soviets will take
necessary action, including military . . . ." In response President
Johnson reports he ordered the U. S. 6th Fleet to move to within
50 miles off the Syrian coast as "a sign that the Soviet Union would
have to deal with us.'
79
'75 Goldwater, supra note 67, at S 5637.
176 Remarks of Senator Goldwater, 117 Cong. Rec. (daily ed.) S 5636-S
5637 (April 26, 1971).
' 7 See appendix A infra at 109.
178 The Evening Star (Washington, D. C.), May 12, 1971, D-4; Johnson,
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Though the preceding illustration refers solely to Israel, the
identical problem exists under the Javits bill in the case of any
other country with which the United States has no national commit-
ment sanctified by action of Congress.
Another situation in which the President would be barred from
taking independent action under most, if not all, of the War Powers
legislation is the deployment of troops or equipment to back up
United States foreign policy objectives in times of great crises, such
as the recurrent Communist pressures on free Berlin. ' In this
connection, the Department of the Navy has compiled a list of
what it calls 55 "wars/near wars" since 1946, in which naval units
were involved, alerted, or redeployed."' All of these movements at
the initiative of the President would be prohibited under the War
Powers legislation to the extent that they back up a national commit-
ment to a foreign country, with the single exception of commitments
specifically dependent upon a treaty or convention which could be
implemented for 30 days under the Javits bill alone.' 2
One more example, pinpointing a need for broad Executive
discretion, is the 1964 Congo rescue effort which saved 2,000 persons,
including about 60 Americans, who were being held hostage by
Congolese rebels.'8 ' Former Secretary of State Rusk has described
the incident:
On one occasion, a large number of Europeans, in-
cluding the staff of the American Consulate and other
American private citizens, were being held as hostages by
a savage group in the Eastern Congo called Simbas. Private
negotiations with the Simbas over a period of weeks had
failed to release the hostages. Threats of execution and
brutal torture mounted. We and the Belgians decided (with
18 °See Rogers, supra note 55, at S 7199.
181 U. S. Dept. of Navy, Summary of Wars/Near Wars Since 1946, 116
Cong. ,Rec. S15712-S15713 (May 15, 1970).
182 See S. 731, supra note 173; S.J. Res. 59, supra note 2, § 2; S.1. Res. 95,
supra note 2, § 3; and S. 1880, supra note 2, §3, which prohibit the President
from inferring a right to act under any law unless that law "specifically
authorizes the use of such forces in armed conflict." See also S.J. Res. 18,
which prohibits deployments to fulfill a treaty obligation qualified by con-
stitutional limitations or conditions. Since nearly all United States defense
treaties "limit" or "condition" our responsibility to act to steps which are
"in accordance with" our own "constitutional processes," S.J. Res. 18 would
seem designed to preclude Presidential initiatives under all such agreements.
See S. Rep. No. 794, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 15. (1967).
183 See appendix A infra at 108.
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the approval of the government of the Congo) to drop
Belgian paratroopers into the area by American aircraft in
order to rescue these hostages who were in a truly desperate
situation. There could not have been action by the Con-
gress without alerting the Simbas as to what was up; the
result would almost certainly have been the summary execu-
tion of American Consular Officers and a considerable
number of American citizens.'
8 4
As compelling as the humanitarian interests are in the Congo
situation, it is doubtful the joint rescue mission would have been
permitted under the rigid lines set by the War Powers legislation.
Insofar as the military operation affected 97% of the persons
evacuated, it would not have been legal under these proposals be-
cause the individuals were not United States citizens.'85 Of course, if
the proposals could be construed broadly enough to permit the
President to employ troops in another country under the guise of
protecting Americans abroad, even though the main purpose or
result reaches far beyond that end, the President can initiate the
use of force in nearly every conceivable situation without running
afoul of the proposals. Today United States citizens can be found
in every nation of the world, including Communist China, a fact
which would enable the President to employ force abroad at any place
he determines necessary under the excuse of protecting our citizens.
This discussion should not be concluded without referring to a
fundamental question posed by some critics of Presidential initiatives.
The flavor is caught in the statement by Henry Steele Commager
who claims that, with the exception of the Civil War and perhaps the
Korean War:
"[T]here are no instances in our history where the use of
war making powers by the Executive without authority of
Congress was clearly and incontrovertibly required by the
nature of the emergency which the nation faced but that
on the contrary in almost every instance the long run
interests of the nation would have been better promoted by
consultation and delay."'
8 6
184 Unpublished letter of Dean Rusk in personal files of Senator Gold-
water.
185 See testimony of Professor Moore where he warns S. 731 would
prohibit "humanitarian intervention similar to the joint United States-Belgian
operation in the Congo if the intervention were not for the protection of
United States nationals." Moore, supra note 46, at S6470.
186 Commager, supra note 48, at S 3357.
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It is difficult to answer matters of subjective judgment. But we
know of one instance in which Secretary Rusk believes "consultation
and delay" would have led to the massacre of some 2,000 human
beings.187 Would these persons and their families conclude the use
of military forces was not clearly required?
If you will ask the citizens of the Southwest whether they think
it was necessary for Presidents Tyler and Polk to deploy American
troops in Mexican territory to protect the people of what was
then the independent Republic of Texas and what is now the State
of Texas,188 you might get a pretty vocal and unanimous reply to the
question. Or if you will consider the stakes riding on a swift Ameri-
can response to Russian brinkmanship during the Cuban missile
crisis, when inaction would have left the United States impotent to
remove missiles which were being aimed at American cities holding
80 million citizens,' 89 most would agree "second-thoughts" would
have made a terrible difference to the well-being of these 80 million
citizens.
The truth is that we just cannot predict what chain of events
might have been instituted if we had failed to act in each of these
192 military incidents. To study them under a microscope might be
worthwhile for a scholar located in an ivy-covered classroom, but for
a President, faced with 20th Century reality, even a week's delay
might see the overrun of an important friendly nation or the rise of an
irremovable threat to national safety.
V. CONCLUSION
The verdict of history, reinforced by occasional judicial pro-
nouncements, convinces the author that the President possesses a
broad authority of independent initiative over the use of military
force outside the United States. It is settled beyond question under
both domestic and international law, that he can deploy fleets, land
troops, order airlifts, or conduct battles in order to protect or rescue
United States citizens and officials, together with their property.' 90
It is equally obvious he can employ the military forces against an
outside enemy who attacks United States territory or poses an im-
minent threat of such an attack. 9'
17 See text accompanying notes 185-86 Supra.
188 See appendix A infra at 91, 92.
189 See KENNEDY, supra note 165, at 35-36.
190 See text accompanying note 104 to note 108 supra.
"91 See text accompanying note 109 supra.
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The author believes any legislation which seeks to lay down rules
restricting in advance the President's ability to use military forces in
these circumstances is illegal. The Constitution does not allow Con-
gress to prohibit the President from acting in these defensive situa-
tions; nor does it permit Congress to impose statutory limitations on
the period of time during which the President may act in these
conditions. To this extent, the War Powers legislation is clearly
unconstitutional.' 92
The President possesses authority which stretches far beyond
that of making an ad hoc, limited response to an emergency where
there is a widely recognized and immediate threat to the safety of
United States citizens or the integrity of United States territory.
Whenever the President, as the primary author for foreign policy
and the exclusive Commander in Chief of United States forces
determines there is a future danger to the ultimate preservation of
the United States and its citizens which is highly probable of arising
either as a direct or indirect result of a present crisis, he may com-
mit United States forces on his own authority in any way he deems
fit for the purpose of defending the future security of this country
and its two hundred and ten million citizens. '93
In the highly complex, interrelated society of the Twentieth Cen-
tury, where the sudden domination of an ocean strait, or control of
a critical resource, or deployment of a radically new weapon, might
install an aggressive nation in a position of exclusive superiority from
which it might dictate terms to all other countries, the Eighteenth Cen-
192 Even Professor Bickel, who otherwise endorsed War Powers legislation,
cautioned: "I don't think the President can be deprived of his power to
respond to an imminent threat of attack (as well as to the attack itself); or
of his power to respond to attacks and threats against our troops wherever
they may be, as well as against our territory; or of the power to continue
to see to the safety of our troops once they are engaged, even if a statutory
30-day period has expired." Bickel, supra note 170, at S12390.
Almost all commentators grant that the Founding Fathers purposefully
left with the President at least "the power to repel sudden attacks." See, e.g.,
Note, The War-Making Powers: The Intentions of the Framers in the Light of
Parliamentary History, 50 BosToN U. L. RaV. 1 (1970).
193Senator Goldwater has put the same view in these words: "I am
convinced there is no question that the President can take military action
at any time he feels danger for the country or for its freedoms or, stretching
a point, for its position in the world." Goldwater, supra note 67, at S5639.
See generally text accompanying note 86 to note 155 supra.
And see position of Bernard Schwartz that: "The unwritten constitutional
law of presidential power (if not the text of the basic document) has all but
vested in the highest officer the virtual authority to make war whenever
deemed necessary to protect the interests of the United States." B. SCHWARTZ,
supra note 72 at 177.
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tury concept of repelling "sudden attacks" must be broadened to en-
compass defense against threats which are probable of becoming
irremovable once allowed to develop unchallenged out of present
moves. The crucial test in the modem world has to be whether the
damaging consequences to United States security are equally grave
and equally likely to happen in the natural flow of events as the
"sudden attack" which the Framers of the Constitution comprehended
in their personal experience.
It is strange indeed that many of the same political liberals who
make highly moving appeals for expanding the scope of federal
jurisdiction and obligation on behalf of urban relief, hyphenated-
Americans, and other social-welfare causes, deny their own preach-
ments about a "living Constitution" when it comes to the President's
ability to defend America's freedoms. Their unbending reliance
upon brief debates at the Constitutional Convention as conveying
the final meaning of the clause "to declare War" marks these com-
mentators as the "strict constructionists" of all time.'
94
The advocates of War Powers legislation have, in general, al-
lowed their repulsion over the tragedy of Vietnam to misguide them
into a strained and rigid interpretation of the Constitution which
is both wrong and unrealistic. Weaving through almost all testimony
in support of War Powers legislation is the theme that there must
not be "another Vietnam.""' In fact, when Senator Javits introduced
his bill, his opening sentence declared: "[T]he most compelling
lesson of the 1960's for the United States is our need to devise pro-
cedures to prevent future undeclared wars as in Vietnam."
1 96
The ironical error about using Vietnam as the reason for curbing
Presidential initiatives is that Congress itself has been deeply involved
with expansion of the Vietnam conflict each step of the way.1
97
Senator Goldwater has documented at least 24 acts of Congress
supporting our continued presence in Vietnam, both before and
after the much discussed Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. 9
194 See, e.g., text accompanying note 41 to note 50 supra; Javits, supra
note 36; Morris, supra note 48; Commager, supra note 48; and Bickel, supra
note 170.
9SSee generally, Bickel, supra note 170 at S12388; Commager, supra
note 48, at S3353; testimony of McGeorge Bundy, inserted in the Cong. Rec.
by Senator Javits, 117 Cong. Rec. (daily ed.) S5629 (April 26, 1971).
196 Javits, supra note 36, at S1204.
1
97 See remarks of Senator Cooper, 117 Cong. Rec. S23722-S23744 (July
10, 1970), with accompanying documents.
198 See remarks of Senator Goldwater, 117 Cong. Rec. (daily ed.) S12446
(July 29, 1971).
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This view has received judicial verification as well. The U. S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled on April 20, 1971,
that: "The Congress and the Executive have taken mutual and
joint action in the prosecution and support of military operations in
Southeast Asia from the beginning of those operations." 99
In concluding, the author does not wish to leave the impression
he believes Congress and the public are helpless to influence deci-
sions on current and prospective foreign military policies. For one
thing, a free press admonishing and criticizing the policy of an
Executive or the Congress can mobilize public opinion in sufficient
strength to change the course of action. Vietnam shows us that much.
For another, Congress can refuse to raise an Armed Force of
the size an "activist" President requires to intervene at several points
across the globe. As a foreshadow of events to come, the 92nd Con-
gress has for the first time set an annual numerical ceiling on the
total authorized active duty strength levels of each of the regular
forces.200
Next, Congress can and must make individual determinations
about specific military actions as they develop every time it votes on
appropriations to continue these actions.2 ' In this manner, Con-
,99 Berk v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039 (1971), cert. denied 40 U.S.L.W. 3166
(1971).
200 During Floor debate on the military draft extension law, Senator
Stennis, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, asserted
this is the first time Congress has set numerical strength levels on the
regular forces, as distinguished from the Reserves, and including volunteers,
officers, and inductees. See remarks of Senator Stennis, 117 Cong. Rec. (daily
ed.) at S9589 (June 21, 1971).
See also Senate Report 92-93 on H. R. 6531, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. at 35
(1971); Pub. L. 92-129, Act of Sept. 28, 1971, § 301.
See generally the report by any Congressional Reference Service, Library
of Congress, Regulating the Size of the Armed Force Under Selective Service
Law, 117 Cong. Rec. (daily ed.) S9590-S9591 (June 21, 1971).
201 For example, following a trip to Saigon in May, 1964, Secretary of
Defense McNamara brought back recommendations for increases in American
assistance, specifically including an increase in the size of the American ad-
visory personnel and a larger air force for South Vietnam. President Johnson
asked for, and obtained, from Congress an additional $125 million in military
aid funds earmarked for these purposes. Pub. L. 88-633, 78 Stat. 1009, 1010;
Pub. L. 88-634, 78 Stat. 1015 (1964).
In 1965, less than nine months after Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin
Resolution, President Johnson sent to Congress an appropriation request
specifically and solely related to the war in Vietnam. In it he asked for
$700 million to support an increase in the number of troops in South Vietnam.
The House of Representatives approved the money by a vote of 408 to 7 and
the Senate approved it by a vote of 88 to 3. 111 Cong. Rec. 9282-9284;
Pub. L. 89-18, 79 Stat. 109 (1965).
In each of these instances Congress was confronted with a policy decision
[Vol. 74
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gress will be making its decision in the setting of the precise emergency
or problem at hand. It will not be trying to erect rules for every kind
of predictable and unpredictable event to come in the long-range
future, but will be dealing with known facts and a specific request
for a certain number of dollars or a certain number of helicopters,
fighter aircraft, or other weapons."' 2
Finally, both Congress and the President can adhere to the
Constitutional expectation that the two political branches of our
to expand the defense commitment in Vietnam in the future. These were not
requests for funds to cover past expenses, but to support future policy. Here
is the kind of clear-cut decision on a specific issue in which the author believes
Congress can play a proper and important role in shaping the advance
course of the nation's activities or in shifting present trends, if it wishes.
202 William H. Rehnquist contends that "at the very heart of the Presi-
dential power as Commander-in-Chief is his sole authority to determine the
tactics and strategy which shall govern the way in which hostilities once
commenced are conducted." SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Docu-
MENTS RELATING TO THE WAR POWER OF CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENT'S
AUTHORITY AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF AND THE WAR IN INDOCHINA, 91st Cong.,
2nd Sess. 177 (July 1970).
Thus a distinction should be made between the decision of Congress to
cut or reject an appropriation of funds for the conduct of hostilities and the
attempt by Congress to dictate rules governing the deployment of forces. For
example, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations was acting within the
authority of Congress in October when it voted to reduce the funds sought
by the Nixon Administration for military and economic assistance in Cam-
bodia from $341 million to $250 million. SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS, Rep. No. 92-404 at 46-47, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
On the other hand, the author believes Congress would have improperly
invaded the President's sphere as the primary source of foreign policy and
Commander in Chief had it passed the so-called "End the War Amendment,"
which called for a total withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam by Decem-
ber 31, 1971. This would be an effort by Congress to "direct the conduct
of campaigns," something the Supreme Court said, in Ex parte Milligan, that
it cannot do. For text of amendment, see 117 Cong. Rec. (daily ed.) at S8760
(June 10, 1971). Cf. Mansfield Amendment no. 427, which simply declares a
policy of withdrawal from Vietnam and "requests" the President to implement
it. See text at 117 Cong. Rec. (daily ed.) S15111 (Sept. 27, 1971).
In some current instances, Congress has passed quasi-restrictions on the
deployment of forces with the acquiescence of the President. Section 843 of
The Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1971, is a case in point.
P. L. 91-668. This provision prohibits "the introduction of American ground
combat troops into Laos or Thailand," but it was not opposed by the Ad-
ministration. Nor had the Administration earlier opposed a restriction against
the introduction of U.S. ground combat troops or advisors into Cambodia when
this provision was placed in the Supplement Foreign Assistance Authorization
Act for 1971. See Pub. L. 91-652; and Congressional Research Service, Library
of Congress, Legislation Enacted by the 91st Congress to Limit United States
Military Involvement in Southeast Asia, March 30, 1971.
So long as the President agrees to comply with the limitation (each of
these two restate a previously announced intention of President Nixon), the
language will have the full force and effect of law. However, it is the author's
view that the President could legally defy these and similar restrictions on
the use of American forces whenever he determines it is vitally necessary to
defend American security.
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government must spend an enormous amount of time working with
each other to avoid the possibility of an impasse at moments of
crisis. The Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and other
ranking decision-makers in each administration must be willing to
meet with committees and subcommittees of Congress hundreds of
times if necessary trying to work together.
For its part, Congress must have the sense of mind and political
courage to shape a recognizable position from which the President
can be guided. This means the pertinent committees must develop
an almost unanimous view on important issues, so that the President
can clearly know the position of the Senate, or the House, as a
corporate body, rather than having to choose from among the
individual points of view of a hundred or so different members.
Thereby, the two branches could better move in unison according
to the true anticipation of our Founding Fathers.
APPENDIX
A. CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF 192 U.S. MILITARY HOSTILITIES'
ABROAD WITHOUT A DECLARATION OF WAR
1798-1800: Naval War with France.
When John Adams became President in 1797, he faced the serious
problem of strained relations between France and the United States, in
which France had made it a practice to seize American merchant ships
and to manhandle their crews. Adams first attempted to negotiate a settlement,
but, when the French demanded exorbitant bribes and loans, his envoys
rejected the proposals and departed.
Adams, thereupon, asked Congress for the power to arm merchant ships
and take other defensive measures. Congress responded by creating a Navy
Department, voting appropriations for new warships, and authorizing the
enlistment of a "Provisional Army" for the duration of the emergency. In
July, 1798, the French treaties and consular conventions were abrogated.
The result was a "quasi-war," during which neither country declared
war. The American Navy attacked only French warships and privateers and
fought primarily for the protection of commerce. Some ninety French ships
were captured during this naval war. In 1800 a convention was agreed to and
peace was achieved. State, 2.2
1800: West Indies.
On April 1, U. S. Marines participated in the action between the U. S.
schooner Enterprise and a Spanish man-of-war brig in the West Indies. USMC,
1, 40.
'The list includes only actual battles, landings, or evacuations. Deploy-
ments to maintain an American presence, or alerts bringing an advanced state
of readiness are not included, except for seven or eight incidents when the risk
of war was unusually grave. No military operations known to have been
subsequently disavowed or repudiated have been included. The list was
prepared with the direction of U. S. Senator Barry Goldwater and is published
with his consent.
2 Authority for each of the listed hostilities is given at the end of its
description. The reference is to one of the sources in the author's SOURCES
FOR COMPILATION which follows this section of the Appendix.
[Vol. 74
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1801-1805: War with Tripoli.
During the early years of the Republic, the United States, following the
practice of several European nations, paid tribute to North African pirates.
Shortly after Jefferson became President, the Pasha of Tripoli, dissatisfied
with the apportionment of tribute, declared war on the United States (May
1801). Jefferson thereupon sent warships to the Mediterranean. After naval
actions and landings under Commodore Preble, an inconclusive treaty of
peace with Tripoli was signed in 1805. Congress passed various enabling
acts during the conflict but never declared war. State, 3.
1806: Mexico (Spanish territory).
Captain Z. M. Pike, with a platoon of troops and on the orders of General
James Wilkinson, invaded Spanish territory at the headwaters of the Rio
Grande, apparently on a secret mission. State, 16.
1806-1810: Gulf of Mexico.
American gunboats operated from New Orleans against Spanish and
French privateers. State, 16.
1810: West Florida (Spanish territory).
Governor Claiborne of Louisiana, on orders from the President, occupied
with troops disputed territory east of the Mississippi as far as the Pearl River.
No armed clash occurred. State, 16.
1813: West Florida (Spanish territory).
On authority granted by Congress, General Wilkinson seized Mobile Bay
with 600 soldiers; a small Spanish garrison gave way without fighting. State,
16.
1813-1814: Marquesas Islands, South Pacific (claimed by Spain).
U. S. Marines built a fort on one of the islands to protect three captured
prize ships. State, 16.
1814-1825: Caribbean Area.
There were repeated engagements between American ships and pirates
both ashore and offshore about Cuba, Puerto Rico, Santo Domingo, and
Yucatan. In 1822, Commodore James Biddle employed a squadron of two
frigates, four sloops of war, two brigs, four schooners, and two gunboats in
the West Indies. The United States sunk or captured 65 vessels. Marine
detachments participated in at least 14 of these actions. State, 16.
1815: Second Barbary War (Algiers).
In 1812 an Algerian naval squadron operated against American shipping
in the Mediterranean. In one attack an American merchantman was captured
and its crew imprisoned. In March, 1815, Congress passed an act that
authorized the use of armed vessels "as may be judged requisite by
the President" to provide effective protection to American commerce in the
Atlantic and the Mediterranean. A naval squadron of 10 vessels under
Commodore Stephen Decatur attacked Algiers, compelling the Dey to
negotiate a treaty. Decatur also demonstrated at Tunis and Tripoli. All three
states were forced to pay for losses to American shipping, and the threats and
tribune terminated. State, 3.
1816-1818: Spanish Florida.
During the "First Seminole War," U. S. forces invaded Spanish Florida
on two occasions. In the first action, they destroyed a Spanish fort harboring
raiders who had made forays into United States territory. In the second,
Generals Jackson and Gaines attacked the Seminole Indians because their
land was a haven for escaped slaves and border ruffians. In the process of
pursuing the Indians, United States forces attacked and occupied Spanish
posts. State, 17.
37
Emerson: War Powers Legislation
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1971
90 WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74
1817: Amelia Island (Spanish Territory).
Under orders from President Monroe, U. S. forces landed and expelled a
group of smugglers, adventurers, and freebooters. State, 17.
1818: Oregon.
The U.SS. Ontario landed at the Colombia River and in August took
possession. Russia and Spain asserted claims to the area. Rogers, 96.
1820: West Africa.
Marines participated in the capture of seven slave schooners by the U. S.
corvette Cyane off Cape Mount and the Gallinos River on the west coast
of Africa during the period from April 5 through 12. USMC, I, 64.
1820-1822: West Coast of South America.
Marines were aboard three of the U. S. ships stationed off the west
coast of South America from 1820 until May, 1822, to protect American com-
merce during the revolt against Spain. USMC, I, 65.
1822: Cuba (Spanish Territory).
U. S. naval forces landed on the northwestern coast of Cuba and burned
a pirate station. State, 17.
1823: Cuba (Spanish Territory).
Between April and October naval forces made a number of landings in
pursuit of pirates, apparently incident to Congressional authorization which
became operative in 1822. State, 17.
1824: Cuba (Spanish Territory).
In October, the U.S.S. Porpoise landed sailors to pursue pirates during
a cruise authorized by Congress. State, 17.
1825: Cuba (Spanish Territory).
In March, British and American forces landed on two offshore Cuban
islands to capture pirates who were based there. The action appears to be
incident to Congressional authority. State, 17.
1827: Greece.
Apparently acting pursuant to legislation, in October and November,
United States forces from the U.S.S. Warren and the U. S. schooner Porpoise
engaged in seven actions against pirate vessels off Greece and made landings
on three Greek Islands. State, 17.
1828: West Indies.
In December, incident to legislation, Marines participated in the capture
of the Argentinean privateer Federal by the U. S. sloop Eric at St. Bartholo-
mew Island, W. I. USMC, I, 67.
1830: Haiti.
On June 5, marines participated in the capture of the slave brig Fenix by
the U. S. schooner Grampus off Cape Haitien, Haiti. USMC, I, 67.
1831-1832: Falkland Islands (Argentina).
American forces under Captain Duncan of the U.S.S. Lexington landed
to investigate the capture of three American sailing vessels. The Americans
succeeded in releasing the vessels and their crews and dispersed the Argentine
colonists. State, 17.
1832: Sumatra.
A force of 250 men from the U.S.S. Potomac landed to storm a fort
and punish natives of a town for an attack on American shipping and the
murder of crew members. State, 18.
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1833: Argentina.
Between October 31 and November 15, at the request of American
residents of Buenos Aires, a force of 43 marines and sailors landed from the
U.S.S. Lexington to protect American lives and property during an insurrection.
State, 18.
1835: Samoan Island.
On October 11, eighty marines and sailors burned the principal village
on the island to avenge harsh treatment meted out to American seamen.
Paullin, 729.
1835-1836: Peru.
Marines from the U.S.S. Brandywine landed at various times at Callao
and Lima to protect American lives and property during a revolt, and to
protect the American Consulate at Lima. State, 18.
1837: Mexico.
On April 16, marines joined in the capture of a Mexican brig-of-war by
the U.S.S. Natchez off Brasos de Santiago for illegal seizure of two American
merchantmen. USMC, I, 70.
1839: Sumatra.
In January, American forces from the U. S. sloop John Adams and the
U. S. frigate Columbia landed at Muckie, Sumatra, to protect American lives
and property and to punish natives of two towns for attacking American ships.
USMC, I, 70.
1840: Fiji Islands.
American forces totaling 70 officers and men, landed on July 12 and
26 to .punish natives of two towns for attacking American exploring and
surveying parties. State, 18.
1841: Samoan Islands.
On February 25, an American force of 70 marines and seamen from
the U.S.S. Peacock landed to avenge the murder of a seaman. They burned
three native villages. USMC, I, 71.
1841: Drummond Island (Kingsmill Group, Pacific Ocean).
On April 6, marines from the U.S.S. Peacock landed and burned two
towns to avenge the murder of a seaman by natives. State, 18.
1843: China.
In June and July, a clash between Americans and Chinese at the Canton
trading post led to the landing of 60 sailors and marines from the St. Louis.
Paullin, 1095-1096.
1843: West Africa.
In November and December, four U. S. vessels from Commodore Perry's
squadron demonstrated and landed various parties (one of 200 marines and
sailors) to discourage piracy and the slave trade along the Ivory Coast and
to punish attacks made by the natives on American seamen and shipping. In
the process, they burned villages and killed a local ruler. The actions appear
to have been pursuant to the Treaty of August 9, 1842, with Great Britain
relative to the suppression of the slave trade. State, 18.
1844: Mexico.
President Tyler deployed our forces to protect Texas against Mexico,
anticipating Senate approval of a treaty of annexation, which was rejected later
in his term. Corwin, 245.
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1844: China.
On June 18, Marines from the U. S. sloop St. Louis went ashore at
Canton, China, to protect American lives. USMC, I, 72.
1845: African coast.
On November 30, Marines joined in the capture of the slave bark Pons
by the U. S. sloop Yorktown off Kahenda, Africa. The action was consistent
with the Treaty of 1842. USMC, I, 72.
1846: Mexico.
President Polk ordered General Scott to occupy disputed territory months
preceding a declaration of war. Our troops engaged in battle when Mexican
forces entered the area between the Nueces and Rio Grande Rivers. The
fighting occurred three days before Congress acted. U.S., 378.
1849: Smyrna (Now Izmir, Turkey).
In July, the U.S.S. St. Louis gained the release of an American seized
by Austrian officials. State, 18.
1850: African coast.
On June 6, Marines joined in capturing a slave ship by the U. S. brig
Perry off Luanda, Africa. The action was consistent with the Treaty of 1842.
USMC, I, 77.
1851: Turkey.
After a massacre of foreigners (including Americans) at Jaffa, the U. S.
Mediterranean Squadron was ordered to demonstrate along the Turkish coast.
Apparently, no shots were fired, but the display amounted to compulsion.
State, 19.
1851: Johanna Island (East of Africa).
The U.S.S. Dale delivered an ultimatum, bombarded the island, and
landed a force to punish the local chieftain for the unlawful imprisonment of
the captain of an American whaler. State, 19.
1852-1853: Argentina.
Several landings of marines took place in order to protect American
residents of Buenos Aires during a revolt. State, 19.
1853: Nicaragua.
American forces landed at Greytown and remained for two days (March
11-13) to protect American lives and interests during political disturbances.
State, 19.
1853: China.
On September 11, a small Marine force from the U. S. steamer Mississippi
boarded a Siamese vessel in the Canton River and put down a mutiny. USMC,
I, 78.
1853: West Coast of Africa.
In accordance with the Treaty of 1842, on December 3, Marines joined
in the capture of the slave schooner Gambrill by the U. S. frigate Constitution
off the Congo River on the west coast of Africa. USMC, I, 78.
1853-1854: Japan.
Commodore Matthew C. Perry led an expedition consisting of four
men-of-war to Japan to negotiate a commercial treaty. Four hundred armed
men accompanied Perry on his initial landing at Edo Bay in July, 1853,
where he stayed for ten days after refusing to leave when ordered. He
then sailed south, landing a force at the Bonin Islands, where he took posses-
sion, and at the Ryukyus, where he established a coaling station. In March,
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1854, he returned to Edo Bay with ten ships and 2,000 men, landed with an
escort of 500 men, and after six weeks signed a treaty with Japanese authorities
at Kanagawa. The whole campaign was on executive authority. State, 19.
1854: West Coast of Africa.
Pursuant to the Treaty of 1842, on March 10, Marines joined in the
capture of a slave brig by the U. S. brig Perry off the west coast of Africa.
USMC, I, 78.
1854: China.
American and British forces consisting of 150 English sailors, 60 U. S.
sailors, and 30 merchant sailors landed at Shanghai on April 4 and stayed
until June 7 to protect their nationals during a battle between Chinese imperial
and revolutionary troops. State, 19.
1854: Greytown, Nicaragua.
In July, the commander of an American naval vessel demanded reparation
after an American official was injured during a riot. When this was not
forthcoming, the vessel bombarded the town. Foreign property, including
British and French, was destroyed. President Pierce defended the action of
the American commander in his annual message to Congress. State, 19.
1854: Okinawa.
On July 6, a force of 20 Marines from the U. S. steamer Powhatan went
ashore on Okinawa and seized a religious shrine in punishment of persons who
murdered, an American. On November 17, Marines and seamen from the
U. S. sloop Vincennes went ashore again at Okinawa to enforce treaty
provisions. USMC, I, 78.
1855: China.
There were two brief actions by U. S. warships, the first a landing in
May at Shanghai to protect American interests there, the second an attack
in August at Hong Kong against pirates. State, 20.
1855: Fiji Islands.
In September and October, marines from the sloop-of-war John Adams
landed four times to seek reparations for depredations against Americans and
to force natives to honor a treaty. The landing parties fought skirmishes and
burned some villages. USMC, I, 79.
1855: Uruguay.
In August and November, U. S. naval forces put sailors ashore to protect
American interests in Montevideo. State, 20.
1856: Panama, Republic of New Granada.
U. S. forces landed and stayed two days to protect American interests,
including the Isthmian railroad, during an insurrection. (By the treaty of
1846 with New Granada, the United States had acquired the right to protect
the Isthmus and to keep it open, in return for guaranteeing its neutrality,)
State, 20.
1856: China.
In October and November, the U. S. warships Portsmouth and Levant
landed 280 officers and men to protect American interests at Canton during
hostilities between the British and the Chinese and in response to an unpro-
voked assault upon an unarmed boat displaying the U. S. flag. The Americans
took and destroyed four Chinese forts. State, 20.
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1858: Uruguay.
Forces from two U. S. warships landed in January to protect American
lives and property during a revolt in Montevideo. The action was taken
in conjunction with the forces of other powers at the request of the local
government. State, 20.
1858: African coast.
On September 8, Marines joined in the capture of a ketch laden with
slave food by the U. S. sloop Marion off the southeast coast of Africa. The
action was consistent with the Treaty of 1842. USMC, I, 80.
1858: Fiji Islands.
On October 6, about 60 marines and sailors from the U.S.S. Vandalia
landed to punish natives for the murder of two American citizens and engaged
in a fierce conflict with 300 native warriors. State, 21.
1858-1859: Turkey.
American citizens were massacred in 1858 at Jaffa and mistreated else-
where. In the face of Turkish indifference, the Secretary of State asked the
U. S. Navy to make a display of force along the Levant. State, 21.
1858-1859: Paraguay.
From October 1858, to February, 1859, an American expedition
went to Paraguay to demand redress for an attack on a naval vessel
in the Parana River during 1855. Apologies were forthcoming after a display
of force, which amounted to compulsion. Congress authorized the action.
State, 21.
1859: African coast.
On April 21 and 27, Marines joined in the capture of a slave ship near
the Congo River, Africa. The action was consistent with the Treaty of 1842.
USMC, I, 81.
1859: Mexico.
Two hundred U. S. soldiers crossed the Rio Grande in pursuit of the
Mexican bandit Cortina. State, 21.
1859. China.
On July 31, forces from the U.S.S. Mississippi landed at Woosung and
Shanghai, where they remained until August 2, to protect American interests
and restore order. The American consul had called on the ship for assistance.
State, 21.
1860: Kissembo, West Africa.
On March 1, 40 Marines and seamen from the sloop-of-war Marion
landed twice to prevent the destruction of American property during a period
of local unrest. State, 21.
1860: Colombia (State of Panama).
On September 27, the Marine guard from the sloop U.S.S. St. Mary's
landed to protect American interests during a revolt. This may have been
authorized pursuant to the Treaty of 1846. State, 21.
1863: Japan.
On July 16, when Japanese shore batteries at Shimonoseki fired on a U. S.
merchant ship, the U.S.S. Wyoming retaliated by firing on three Japanese
vessels lying at anchor. The shots were returned, and, by the time the action
was over, there were casualties on both sides.
(Vol. 74
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1864: Japan.
From July 14 to August 3, U. S. forces protected the U. S. Minister to
Japan when he visited Yedo concerning some American claims against
Japan. The forces also were designed to impress the Japanese with American
power. LRS, IV, 52.
1864. Japan.
Between September 4 and 8, naval forces of the United States, Great
Britain, France, and the Netherlands jointly forced open the Straits of
Shimonoseki, which had been closed in violation of commercial agreements.
Shore batteries were destroyed and 70 cannon seized. State, 21.
1865-1866: Mexican border.
In late 1865, General Sheridan was dispatched to the Mexican border
with 50,000 troops to back up the protest made by Secretary of State Seward
to Napoleon III that the presence of over 25,000 French troops in Mexico
"is a serious concern to the United States." In February, 1866, Seward
demanded a definite date be set for withdrawal and France complied. Though
American forces did not cross the border, the threat of foreign military
operations was clear and imminent. U. S., 580-581.
1865: Panama.
American forces from the U.S.S. St. Marys landed to protect American
interests during a revolt. This was apparently implied by the Treaty of 1846.
State, 22.
1866: China.
Various landings by over 100 marines and seamen were made in June
and July at Newchwang to punish an assault on the American Consul and to
guard diplomats. State, 22.
1867: Formosa.
On June 13, 181 Marines and seamen from the U.S.S. Hartford and U.S.S.
Wyoming landed to punish natives who had murdered the crew of a wrecked
American merchantman. Several huts were burned. USMC, I, 91.
1867: Nicaragua.
On September 6, Marines landed and occupied Managua and Leon.
USMC, I, 92.
1868: Japan.
From February 1 until April 4, landings were made at Hiago, Nagasaki,
and Yokohama to protect American lives and property during local hostilities.
USMC, I, 92.
1868: Uruguay.
At the request of local Uruguayan authorities, several landings were
made from five U. S. steamers at Montevideo during the month of February
in order to protect American lives and property during an insurrection.
State, 22.
1868: Colombia.
An American force landed at Aspinwall in April to protect the transit
route during the absence of local police. This was impliedly permitted by the
Treaty of 1846. State, 22.
1870: Mexico.
On June 17, the U.S.S. Mohican pursued a pirate ship up the Tecapan
River near Mazatlan, landed a party of Marines and seamen, and destroyed
it during a pitched battle. State, 22.
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1871: Korea.
In June, American landing forces under Admiral Rodgers captured five
Korean forts after a surveying party, granted permission to make certain sur-
veys and soundings, had been attacked. No treaty or convention was in effect.
State, 22.
1873: Colombia.
In May and September, nearly 200 American forces landed at the Bay
of Panama to protect American lives and interests during local hostilities.
The actions were impliedly allowed by the Treaty of 1846. State, 22.
1873-1882: Mexico.
U. S. troops repeatedly crossed the Mexican border to pursue cattle
thieves. Mexico occasionally reciprocated. Such incursions were finally
recognized as legitimate by an agreement in 1882. State, 23.
1874: Hawaii.
In February, a party of 150 men from two U. S. vessels landed to
preserve order at the request of local authorities. State, 23.
1876: Mexico.
On May 16, at the request of the U. S. Consul at Matamoras, a small
American force was landed to preserve order when the town was temporarily
without a government. State, 23.
1882: Egypt.
On July 14, over 100 forces from the U.S.S. Lancaster, U.S.S. Quinne-
baug, and U.S.S. Nipsic landed at Alexandria, when the city was being
bombarded by the British navy, in order to protect American interests there,
including the American consulate. State, 23.
1885: Colombia (State of Panama).
On January 18, March 16, March 31, April 8, April 11, April 12, and
April 25, American forces landed to protect American property and guard
valuables in transit over the Isthmus during local revolutionary activity, an
action authorized under the Treaty of 1846. USMC, I, 96.
1888: Korea.
On June 19, 25 men from the U.S.S. Essex landed at Chemulpo and
marched to Seoul to protect American residents during unsettled political
conditions. The action was requested by the American Minister. State, 23.
1888-1889: Samoan Islands.
In 1886, the German consul announced that the Sanwan group was
henceforth a German protectorate, an action that brought the United States
and Great Britain together in opposition. By 1889, Germany and the United
States were close to a direct confrontation. The United States and Germany,
together with Great Britain, shared certain treaty rights in Samoa for the
maintenance of naval depots. In November 1888, U. S. Marines landed
from the U.S.S. Nipsic to protect American interests after civil strife broke
out ashore. In January, 1889, German forces landed, and, when those forces
were attacked by the natives, German ships shelled the island. This action by
Germany aroused the American public, and Congress appropriated $500,000
for the protection of American lives and property on the island and $100,000
for the development of Pago Pago harbor. The United States also ordered
two more warships to the scene. All three powers had warships on the scene
and an untoward event might have touched off war had not a hurricane in
March, 1889, destroyed all the warships except one British vessel. There-
after, the Germans invited the three powers to a conference, which was
agreed to and held in Berlin. In April, 1889, they established a three-power
protectorate there. In 1899 the Samoans were divided, the United States
acquiring Tutuila. State, 23.
[Vol. 74
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1888: Haiti.
In December, American warships made a display of force to obtain the
release of an American merchant vessel captured by a Haitian warship.
The Haitian Government surrendered the ship and paid an indemnity after
Admiral Luce gave an ultimatum ordering its release before sunset. State, 24.
1889: Hawaii.
On July 30, at the request of the American Minister in Honolulu, the
U.S.S. Adams sent a marine guard ashore to protect American lives and
property during revolutionary disorder. State, 24.
1890: Argentina.
The U.S.S. Tallapoosa landed a party in July to protect the American
Consulate and Legation in Buenos Aires during a revolt. State, 24.
1891: Navassa Island, Haiti.
American forces from the U.S.S. Kearsarge landed on June 2 to protect
American lives and property during a period of unrest. The action was taken
pursuant to Congressional action. State, 24.
1891: Bering Sea.
An American squadron operated from June to October, jointly with
British naval vessels, seizing four schooners. Rogers, 109.
1891: Chile.
In August, 102 Americans of the South Pacific station landed at Val-
paraiso during a revolt in order to protect the American Consultate and
American lives. State, 24.
1894: Brazil.
The U. S. Navy engaged in gunfire and a show of force in January to
protect American shipping at Rio de Janeiro during a revolt of the Brazilian
navy. President Cleveland stated our action "was clearly justified by public
law." State, 24.
1894: Nicaragua.
In July, American forces landed at Bluefields to protect American interests
during a revolt. State, 24.
1894-1896: Korea.
On July 24, at the request of the American Minister, a force of 21
Marines and 29 sailors landed at Chemulpo and marched to Seoul to protect
American lives and property during the Sino-Japanese War. A Marine guard
remained at the American Legation until 1896. State, 24.
1894-1895: China.
On December 6, 1894, Marines disembarked from the U.S.S. Baltimore
at Taku and marched to Tientsin to protect American lives and property during
the Sino-Japanese War. The landing party maintained order until May 16,
1895. USMC, I, 98.
1895: Colombia (State of Panama).
Marines from the U.S.S. Atlanta landed in March to protect American
interests during a revolt. This appears to have been authorized by treaty. State,
24.
1895-1896: Korea.
During internal disorders from October 11, 1895.' to April 3, 1896,
the American Legation at Seoul was protected by Marines from various ships.
Ellsworth, 60.
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1896: Nicaragua.
On May 2, Marines were put ashore at Corinto by the U.S.S. Alert during
revolutionary disorders to protect American interests. USMC, I, 99.
1898: Nicaragua.
On February 7, Marines landed at San Juan del Sur by the U.S.S. Alert to
protect Americans against disorders. USMC, I, 99.
1898-1899: China.
American forces guarded the Legation at Peking and the Consulate at
Tientsin from November, 1898, to March, 1899, during a period of unrest.
State, 25.
1899: Nicaragua.
On February 24, in response to a petition from foreign merchants during
an insurrection, Marines landed to protect life and property at San Juan del
Norte and Bluefields. State, 25.
1899: Samoan Islands.
Sixty Americans landed on February 14 from the U.S.S. Philadelphia, and
on April 1 joined a British force in efforts to disperse native rebels. This may
have been under color of treaty or statue. State, 25.
1899-1901: Philippine Islands.
The United States employed 126,468 troops against the Philippine In-
surrection without a declaration of war after the Treaty of Peace with Spain
was concluded. Presumably the United States acted to suppress the rebellion
under authority of the Treaty of Peace, which transferred to it the sovereignty
possessed by Spain in the Philippine Islands. 40 Ct. of Claims 26-32.
1900-1901: "Boxer" Rebellion (Peking).
In 1900 President McKinley sent 5,000 troops to join the international
military force organized for the relief of foreign legations besieged in
Peking by Chinese "Boxers." Using troops already mobilized for the Spanish-
American War and the Philippine Insurrection, McKinley did not seek authority
from Congress. Peace terms were concluded at an international conference,
and a peace Protocol was signed September 7, 1901. The Protocol was not
submitted to Congress. Because of the obvious inability of Chinese authorities
to control local disorders, the United States acquired the right to maintain
a guard at Peking for defense of the American Legation and to station military
forces at certain points in Chinese territory to keep open communications be-
tween Peking and the sea. (Earlier, in 1858, the United States had acquired the
right by treaty to station naval vessels in Chinese waters.) State, 3-4.
1901: Colombia (State of Panama).
American forces went ashore in late November and stayed until December
to protect American property and to keep transit lines open across the Isthmus
during serious political disturbances. This apparently was authorized by
the Treaty of 1846. State, 25.
1902: Colombia (State of Panama).
Marine guards landed in April to protect American lives and the railroad
across the Isthmus during civil disorders. They continued to land at various
times between April and November. This appears to have been authorized by
the Treaty of 1846. State, 25.
1903: Honduras.
American forces disembarked at Puerto Cortez in March to protect








In April, 29 Marines landed at Santo Domingo, where they remained for
three weeks to protect American interests during a period of political dis-
turbances. State, 25.
1903-1904: Syria.
A Marine guard landed and remained for a few days at Beirut in April
to protect the American Consulate during a Moslem uprising. Also our
Mediterranean Squadron demonstrated at Beirut from September to January
and at Smyrna the next August. State, 25.
1903: Panama.
A revolution leading to the independence of Panama from Colombia broke
out in November. Marines landed from the U.S.S. Dixie to prevent Colombian
troops from carrying out a threat to kill American citizens, after Commander
Hubbard had refused to allow the Colombians to transport their troops across
the Isthmus. Marine guards remained on the Isthmus from the date of
Panamanian independence (November 4, 1903) until January, 1914, to protect
American interests during the construction of the Canal. This was allowed
under the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty. State, 25-26.
1903-1904: Abyssinia.
Twenty-five American marines were sent to protect the U. S. Consul
General from November 18, 1903, to January 15, 1904, while he was
negotiating a treaty with the Emperor. USMC, I, 109.
1904: Dominican Republic.
On January 3, 7, and 17, and on February 11, over 300 Marines landed
at Puerto Plata, Sosua, and Santo Domingo to protect American lives and
property during a revolt. USMC, I, 108-109.
1904: Morocco.
A squadron demonstrated in Moroccan waters in June to force the re-
lease of a kidnapped American. A Marine contingent had landed on May 30
to protect the Consul General. State, 26.
1904: Panama.
American troops were used to protect American lives and property at
Ancon in November when a revolt seemed imminent. This action seems
to have been authorized by treaty. State, 26.
1904-1905: Korea.
In January, 1904, over 100 American troops were sent to guard the
American Legation at Seoul because of the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese
War. They remained until November 1905. In March, 1904, marines assisted
in the evacuation of American nationals. USMC, I, 108.
1906-1909: Cuba.
An American squadron demonstrated off Havana, and, in September,
marines landed to protect American interests during a revolution. In October,
marine and army units landed and took up quarters in many Cuban towns
in connection with the temporary occupation of the country under a pro-
visional governor appointed by the United States. This occupation was within
the scope of the provision of the 1903 Treaty of Relations between the two
countries, which gave the United States the right to intervene to preserve
order. The occupation lasted until January, 1909. State, 26.
1907: Honduras.
On March 18, during a war between Honduras and Nicaragua, the
U.S.S. Marietta disembarked 10 men to guard the American Consulate at
Trujillo. The U.S.S. Paducah also landed forces at Laguna and Choloma on
April 28. State, 26.
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1910: Nicaragua.
In May, one hundred men from the U.S.S. Paducah landed at Greytown
to protect American lives and property during a revolt. The U.S.S. Dubuque
also engaged in shows of force. Joined combat was "hourly expected."
State, 26.
1911: Honduras.
Sixty men from the U.S.S. Tacoma and Marietta went ashore at Puerto
Cortez during a revolt to protect American interests. The American Com-
mander threatened to use force if necessary. State, 26.
1911-1912: China.
American forces made six landings to protect American interests during
the initial stages of a revolution. They were stationed at Foochow, Chinkiang,
Peking, Hankow, Nanking, Shanghai, and Taku. This may have occurred
pursuant to treaty rights acquired during the "Boxer" Rebellion. State, 27.
1912: Panama.
During June and July, at the request of local political groups, American
troops supervised elections outside the Canal Zone. This was impliedly
authorized by the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty. State, 27.
1912: Cuba.
In May, American troops landed in eastern Cuba during a revolt and
remained for three months to protect American interests. This appears to have
been authorized by the treaty of 1903. State, 27.
1912: Turkey.
A troop detachment from the U.S.S. Scorpion assisted in the protection of
the diplomatic corps at Istanbul during the Balkan War. State, 27.
1912: Nicaragua.
During a civil war, the President of Nicaragua asked the United States
to protect its citizens resident there. Acting on a recommendation of the
American Minister, President Taft ordered sizable landings of marines
in August and September, 1912. Political stability returned to Nicaragua by
January, 1913, but a detachment of marines was kept in Managua to guard the
American Legation after the rest of the American troops withdrew. The
Legation guard was reinforced in 1922 and remained until August 1, 1925.
State, 27.
1913: China.
U. S. forces landed in July at Chapei and Shanghai to protect American
interests. Rogers reports there were many demonstrations and landing parties
by United States forces for protection in China continuously from 1912 to
1941. He writes: "In 1927, for example, this country had 5,670 troops ashore
in China and 44 naval vessels in its waters. In 1933 we had 3,027 armed
men ashore. All this protective action was in general terms based on treaties
with China ranging from 1858 to 1901." Rogers, 117.
1913: Mexico.
In September a few Marines disembarked at Ciaris Estero, during a period
of civil strife, to aid in the evacuation of American citizens. State, 27.
1914: Haiti.
Marines landed in January, February, and August to protect American
citizens during a period of unrest. State, 27.
1914: Dominican Republic.
During a period of revolutionary activity, U. S. naval forces fired at
revolutionaries who were bombarding Puerto Plata, in order to stop the
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action. Also, by a threat of force, fighting in Santo Domingo was pre-
vented. State, 28.
1914: Occupation of Vera Cruz, Mexico.
On April 9, 1914, an American naval officer and 9 crewmen from the
U.S.S. Dolphin anchored off the coast at Tampico, Mexico, were arrested
and marched through the streets by local authorities. They were released and
an apology was extended as soon as the local Mexican commander learned
of the incident. Admiral Mayo, commander of the American squadron, also
demanded a 21-gun salute to the American flag. The Mexicans refused and
President Wilson promptly ordered the North Atlantic battleship fleet to
Tampico. On April 20, he addressed Congress in a joint session and asked for
authority to use the armed forces. While Congress debated, Wilson learned
that a German steamer was headed toward Vera Cruz to unload munitions for
Huerta, and he decided to direct the naval action against Vera Cruz instead
of Tampico. American armed forces landed at Vera Cruz, and, after an
armed engagement resulting in 400 casualties, the Americans occupied the city
on April 22. The same day, apparently after the fighting began, Congress
passed a joint resolution which declared that the President was "justified in
the employment of the armed forces of the United States to enforce his demand
for unequivocal amends for certain affronts and indignities committed against
the United States,' but that "the United States disclaimed any hostility to the
Mexican people or any purpose to make war upon Mexico." By November,
1914, American troops had left Mexican soil. State, 4.
1915: Dominican Republic.
On August 15, the 5th Marine Regiment arrived at Puerto Plata to
protect American lives and property during a revolutionary outbreak. Their
protective mission lasted until October 12, 1915. USMC, I, 116.
1915-1934: Haiti.
In July, at the initiative of the Executive, the United States placed Haiti
under the military and financial administration of the United States, in part
to protect American lives and property and in part to forestall European inter-
vention to collect debts. Marines were stationed in Haiti until 1934. The oc-
cupation was sanctioned by a treaty signed and ratified by the Senate in
February, 1916, but the first months of the occupation were on executive
authority alone. State, 28.
1916-1924: Dominican Republic.
President Wilson ordered the occupation of Santo Domingo in May,
1916, owing to local unrest. At one point, 3,000 marines were ashore. The
United States placed a military governor in the Dominican Republic but
turned political affairs over to the Dominicans in 1922. U. S. troops with-
drew in 1924, and a general treaty signed that year formally sanctioned the
previous occupation. State, 28.
1916: China.
American forces landed at Nanking to quell a riot taking place on
American property. Apparently this was authorized by a treaty. State, 28.
1916-1917: Pershing Expedition into Mexico.
In October, 1915, the United States recognized the Carranza regime
as the de facto government in Mexico. At the same time, Mexican rebel,
Pancho Villa, directed a campaign against the United States. In January,
1916, Villas followers massacred 18 American mining engineers in Santa
Ysabel, Mexico.
Then, on March 9, 1916, 400 of Villa's men raided Columbus, New
Mexico, and killed 17 Americans. The American public was incensed, and
Wilson delayed sending an expedition only until he could obtain Carranza's
consent. On March 13, 1916, when Carranza's government acceded, Wilson
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ordered General John J. Pershing to take U. S. Army units into Mexico. On
March 16, Pershing crossed the border with 6,000 troops. On the following
day, Congress adopted a joint resolution introduced by Senator Robert LaFol-
lette sanctioning the use of the armed forces. Until then, Wilson had been
relying on the Acts of 1795 and 1807 relative to employing the armed forces
whenever there is 'imminent danger of invasion.'
Villa eluded Pershing, and the size of the U. S. expedition soon grew to
such proportions (12,000 men) that Carranza protested and demanded its
withdrawal, threatening war. Wilson on June 18 called out the National
Guard and incorporated it into the Army; 150,000 militia were ordered to
the Mexican border. But neither country really wanted war, and the crisis
gradually subsided. Wilson decided to withdraw all American troops from
Mexico in February, 1917. State, 5-6.
1917: Armed Atlantic Merchant Ships.
In February, President Wilson asked Congress for authority to arm U. S.
merchant vessels with defensive guns, but Congress refused to pass such a
law. Thereupon President Wilson acted, on his own authority, to equip
American merchant vessels with guns and gunners assigned to them from the
Navy. His action occurred prior to the declaration of war on Germany which
did not take place until April 6, 1917. Willoughby, 1m, 1568.
1917: Cuba.
American troops landed in February at Manzanilla to protect American
interests during a revolt. Various other landings were made, and, though
the revolt ended in April, 1917, troops remained until 1922 because of con-
tinued unsettled political conditions. This was authorized by the Treaty of
1903. State, 28.
1918: China.
American troops landed at Chungking to protect American lives during
a political crisis. Apparently this was done pursuant to a treaty. State, 28.
1918-1919: Mexico.
U. S. troops entered Mexico to pursue bandits three times in 1918 and six
times in 1919. In August, 1918, there was a brief skirmish between American
and Mexican troops at Nogales. State, 28.
1918-1920: Expeditions to Russia.
Following the Bolshevik revolution in Russia in 1917, Allied expeditions
landed, in 1918, at Murmansk and then Archangel. American troops first
landed in August, 1918, with most arriving in Archangel Harbor on Septem-
ber 4. Though Armistice Day came on November 11, 1918, the American
forces remained until June 27, 1919. At Archangel, the U. S. contributed
some 5,208 men and suffered some 549 casualties, including 244 deaths.
The Allies also landed units in Siberia in August and September of
1918 where Bolshevik troops were fighting a force of 65,000 Czech soldiers
who were trying to fight their way eastward. The Japanese sent 74,000
soldiers; the Americans sent 8,388; and the British and French provided minor
contingents. The American forces began embarking for home on January
17, 1920, and the last units left on April 1, 1920.
President Wilson, who acted without Congressional approval, agreed to
participate in the Allied expeditions to aid the anti-Bolsheviks, to help several
thousands of Czech troops get back to their homeland, and to forestall pos-
sible Japanese expansionist plans in Siberia. State, 6.
1919: Turkey.
On May 14, a Marine detachment from the U.S.S. Arizona landed to
guard the U. S. Consulate at Constantinople during the Greek occupation
of the city. USMC, I, 121.
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1919: Honduras.
A small American force went ashore at Puerto Cortez to maintain
order in a neutral zone during an attempted revolt. State, 29.
1918-1920: Panama.
American troops went outside the Canal Zone, on request of the Pana-
manian Government, to supervise elections. This apparently was authorized
by treaty. LRS, 55.
1920: China.
American forces landed at Kiukang and Youchow to protect American
lives and property. This may have been authorized by treaty. State, 29.
1920: Guatemala.
Forty men from the U.S.S. Tacoma and Niagara went inland to Guate-
mala City to protect the American Legation and other American interests
during local fighting. State, 29.
1920-1922: Siberia.
The United States stationed a marine guard on Russian Island, Bay of
Vladivostok, to protect United States radio facilities and other property.
State, 29.
1921: Panama-Costa Rica.
American naval squadrons demonstrated for one day on both sides of the
Isthmus to prevent war between the two countries over a boundary dispute.
This was impliedly authorized by treaty. State, 29.
1922: Turkey.
In September forces from several American warships went ashore with
the consent of both Greek and Turkish authorities to protect American interests
when the Turkish forces were advancing on the city of Smyrna. State, 29.
1922-1923: China.
There were five landings by Marines from April, 1922, to November, 1923
(at Peking, Tientsin, Taku, Tungshan, and Masu Island) to protect Americans
during periods of unrest. This may have been authorized by treaty. USMC, I,
122-123.
1924-1925: Honduras.
There were intermittent landings from February, 1924, to April, 1925, to
protect American lives and property during local unrest. In March, 1924, the
Denver put ashore 167 men and in September, the U.SS. Rochester landed
111 additional forces. USMC, I, 123-124.
1924-1925: China.
From September, 1924, to December, 1924, over seven landings were
made by the Marines at Shanghai to protect Americans during a period of
unrest. This may have been authorized by treaty. USMC, I, 124-125.
1925: Panama.
As a result of strikes and rent riots, and at the request of Panamanian
officials, 600 troops from the Canal Zone entered Panama City in October
and remained for 11 days to maintain order. This conformed to American
treaty rights. State, 29.
1926-1933: Nicaragua.
When local disturbances broke out in 1926, the Nicaraguan Government
requested that American forces undertake to protect lives and property of
Americans and other foreigners. In 1927, five thousand soldiers were put
ashore.
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Rebel political leader, Sandino, who received Communist propaganda
and financial support, turned the situation into a real civil war. In January,
1928, Sandino was forced to flee to Mexico by Marine forces, but backed by
Communist aid, he returned in 1930 and Nicaragua flared again. By 1933
an all-Nicaraguan Guardia Nacional became strong enough so that all U. S.
Marines could leave. In all the marines had engaged in 150 clashes and
lost 97 men, 32 in action. Rebel losses were approximately over a thousand.
The occupation was initiated entirely on the executive responsibility of
President Coolidge. The Democrat minority bitterly criticized his policy as a
"private war" and as "imperialism," but did not question the President's
authority. State, 6-7; and Dupuy and Baumer, 168.
1926: China.
American forces landed at Hankow in August and September and at
Chingwangtao in November to protect American interests. This may have
been authorized by treaty. State, 29.
1927-1928: Armed Actions in China.
Anti-foreign incidents in China reached a climax in 1927.
In February, a U. S. expeditionary battalion landed at Shanghai, and in
March, 1,228 Marine reinforcements landed there. By the end of 1927, the
United States had 44 naval vessels in Chinese waters and 5,670 men ashore.
In 1928, when the Nationalists had gained greater control over Chinese
territory and purged themselves of Communist support, the United States
reached a separate accord with the Nationalists, and, in July, signed a treaty
which constituted United States recognition of the Nationalist Government. A
gradual reduction of United States forces in China began in the same month.
State, 7-8.
1932: China.
In February, American forces landed at Shanghai to protect American
interests during the Japanese occupation of the city, apparently under treaty.
State, 30.
1933: Cuba.
During a revolution, United States naval forces demonstrated offshore,
but no forces landed. This was pursuant to the Treaty of 1903. State, 30.
1934: China.
In January, marines from the U.S.S. Tulsa landed at Foochow to protect
the American Consulate, apparently pursuant to treaty rights. USMC, I, 129.
1936: Spain.
From July 27, through September 19, the Quincy, carrying a marine
guard, served in the Spanish war zone. The vessel touched at several ports,
sometimes evacuating American nationals. (Master rolls.)
1937-1938: China.
Beginning on August 12, 1937, several marine landings were made at
Shanghai to protect American interests during Sino-Japanese hostilities. Marine
strength in China, assigned under the International Defense Scheme, reached
2,536 men by September 19. USMC, II, 2-3.
1940: British possessions in Western Atlantic.
On September 3, President Roosevelt informed Congress that he had
agreed to deliver a flotilla of destroyers to Great Britain in exchange for a
series of military basis granted us on British soil along the Western Atlantic.
American troops and ships occupied a number of these points in the following
months. The President did not ask approval from Congress. State, 8-9.
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In April, after the German invasion of Denmark, the U. S. Army oc-
cupied Greenland under agreement with the local authorities. Congress was
not consulted, and the action appears to be contrary to an express Con-
gressional limitation on using troops outside the Western Hemisphere. State,
8-9.
1941: Iceland.
By Presidential order, U. S. troops occupied Iceland on July 7, the same
day Congress was notified. The President did not consult Congress in advance,
and, in fact, the action clearly violated an express restriction that Congress had
enacted a year before. Both the Reserves Act of 1940 and the Selective Service
Act of 1940 provided that United States troops could not be used outside
the Western Hemisphere. Iceland is generally placed with the section on
Europe in each World Atlas and is some 2,300 miles away from the United
States. State, 8-9.
1941: Dutch Guiana.
In November, the President ordered American troops to occupy Dutch
Guiana by agreement with the Netherlands Government-in-exile. Again there
was no Congressional authority for the military occupation. State, 8-9.
1941: Atlantic Convoys.
By July 7, President Roosevelt had ordered U. S. warships to convoy
supplies sent to Europe to protect military aid to Britain and Russia. By
September, our ships were attacking German submarines. There was no
authorization from Congress. Corwin, 247.
1946: Turkey.
In April, during USSR-Iran hostilities and USSR-Turkey tensions, a U. S.
carrier unit was deployed as an affirmation of U. S. intentions to shore up
Turkey against Soviet imperialism. USN, 15712.
1946: Trieste.
In July, during the Trieste ownership dispute, U. S. Naval units were
dispatched to the scene with open warfare imminent. USN, 15712.
1946: Greece.
During the political crisis in September, naval units were requested by the
U. S. Ambassador. One carrier was on the scene. USN, 15712.
1948: Palestine.
On July 18, a Marine consular guard was detached from the U.S.S.
Kearsarge and sent to Jerusalem to protect the U. S. Consular General there.
One consular official was assassinated, and two Marines were wounded during
the Arab-Israeli War. USMC, III, 7.
1948: Mediterranean.
On January 7, Fleet Admiral Nimitz implied Marine reinforcements sent
from the U. S. to Mediterranean waters served as a warning to Yugoslavia
that the 5,000 U. S. Army troops in Trieste were not to be molested. USMC,
In.I, 5.
1948-1949: China.
A platoon of Marines was sent to Nanking in November, 1948, to
protect the American Embassy when the fall of the city to Communist troops
was imminent. The guard was withdrawn on April 21, 1949. In November
and December, Marines were sent to Shanghai to aid in the evacuation of
American Nationals and to protect the 2,500 Americans in the Communist
encircled city. USMC, 11, 8-9.
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1950-1953: Korean Conflict.
Communist armies of North Korea invaded South Korea on June 25,
1950. Later that day the United Nations Security Council denounced the
aggression, called for an immediate cease-fire, and asked member nations "to
render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolu-
tion." On June 27, President Truman announced that he had "ordered United
States air and sea forces to give the Korean Government troops cover and
support" and had ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on
Formosa and also to prevent the Chinese Government on Formosa from
conducting any air and sea operations against the Communist mainland. The
Security Council, on the same day, adopted a resolution "that the members
of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may
be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and
security in the area."
The Department of State prepared a memorandum, on July 3, 1950,
which defended the authority of the President to take the necessary action to
repel the attack on Korea, using the argument that the "President, as Com-
mander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, has full control
over the use thereof."
Truce talks began in July, 1951, but it was not until July, 1953, that an
armistice was signed. State, 9-11.
1954-1955: Tachen Islands (China).
From July, 1954, to February, 1955, U. S. Naval units were employed
in evacuation of U. S. civilians and military personnel. Five carriers were on
the scene. USN, 15712.
1956: Egypt.
On November 1 and 2, a Marine battalion evacuated over 1,500 persons,
mostly U. S. nationals, from Alexandria, Egypt, during the Suez crisis. USMC,
111, 34.
1957: Indonesia.
On February 14, the 3rd Marines took up station 550 miles northeast of
Sumatra ready to intervene to protect U. S. nationals during the Indonesian
revolt. USMC, m, 34.
1957: Taiwan.
During Communist shelling of Kinmen Island in July, naval units were
dispatched to defend Taiwan. Four carriers were on the scene. USN, 15712.
1958: Venezuela.
In January, when mob violence erupted in Caracus, a company of
Marines embarked on board the U.S.S. Des Moines and remained on station
off Venezuela ready to protect American interests. USMC, 11I, 36.
1958: Indonesia.
In March, a Marine company, attack squadron, and helicopter squadron
were deployed with elements of the Seventh Fleet off Indonesia prepared to
protect U. S. citizens and interests. USMC, 1m, 36.
1958: Lebanon Operation.
A period of civil unrest began in Lebanon in May, 1958, led by Moslems
who reportedly were aided by the United Arab Republic's President Nasser.
When a pro-Nasser coup took place in Iraq July 14, President Chamoun of
Lebanon appealed for assistance to President Eisenhower. On July 15, President
Eisenhower sent 5,000 marines to Beirut to "protect American lives" and to"assist" Lebanon in preserving its political independence. The President
publicly stressed the provocative Soviet as well as Cairo radio broadcasts.
Eventually, 14,000 American soldiers and marines occupied strategic areas in
Lebanon, but with orders not to shoot unless shot at.
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On the day of the initial landings, the United States asked the United
Nations Security Council to establish an international police force to preserve
Lebanon's independence, but the Soviet delegate vetoed the American resolu-
tion. Further, the Soviet Union announced that it would hold military
maneuvers near the Turkish and Iranian frontiers.
On August 21, the General Assembly passed a resolution calling on the
member states to respect one another's territorial integrity and observe strict
non-interference in one another's internal affairs. The resolution requested
that practical arrangements be made leading to the withdrawal of troops from
Lebanon. On September 26, the United States notified the Secretary-General
of the United Nations that it had been possible to withdraw a portion of the
American forces and to work out a schedule to withdraw the remainder by
the end of October. State, 11-12.
1959-1960: Cuba.
In the period from November 20, 1959, to February 15, 1960, the 2d
Marine Ground Task Force was deployed to protect U. S. nationals during the
Cuban crisis. USMC, 111, 42.
1961: Show of Naval Force in Dominican Waters.
On May 30, Dominican dictator Rafael Trujillo was assassinated. Politi-
cal conditions in the Dominican Republic steadily deteriorated during the
summer and early autumn. Then, on November 15, General Hector Trujillo
and General Jose Trujillo, brothers of the slain dictator, returned to the
island. Secretary Rusk stated three days later they appeared "to be planning
an attempt to reassert the dictatorial domination of the political and economic
life of the country . . ." He added: "the United States is considering the
further measures that unpredictable events might warrant."
On November 19, U. S. Navy ships took up positions three miles off the
Dominican coast, and Navy jet planes patrolled the shoreline. The show of
force produced the desired result because the Trujillo brothers and other mem-
bers of the family departed for Miami before the day was over. According
to one authority, "It later transpired that the Kennedy Administration was
prepared to order U. S. Marines ashore if President Joaquin Balaguer had so
requested or if the Trujillos had ousted Balaguer from the presidency." ERR,
449-500.
1962: Thailand.
On May 17, the 3d Marine Expeditionary Unit landed in Thailand to
support that country during the threat of Communist pressure from outside.
On July 1, President Kennedy ordered 1,000 Marines in Thailand to return
to their ships, and on July 30, the U. S. completed the withdrawal of the
5,000 Marines sent there. USMC, III, 56-57.
1962: Cuban Naval Quarantine.
On October 24, confronted with a build-up of Soviet surface-to-surface
missile bases in Cuba, President Kennedy ordered a quarantine 500 miles
wide in the waters around Cuba. The blockade was aimed both at preventing
delivery of additional Russian missiles and obtaining the removal of those
offensive Russian weapons already in Cuba.
The crisis appears to date from Tuesday, October 16, when the Govern-
ment's inner circles first began to discuss the idea of a blockade. On October
20, the First Armored Division began to move out of Texas into Georgia,
and five more divisions were placed on alert. The base at Guantanamo Bay
was strengthened. The Navy deployed 180 ships into the Caribbean. The
Strategic Air Command was dispersed to civilian airfields, and the B-52 bomber
force was ordered into the air fully loaded with atomic bombs.
On October 22, President Kennedy went on television to explain before
the nation the situation in Cuba and the reasons for the quarantine. The
President first notified members of Congress that same day. On Tuesday,
October 23, the Council of the Organization of American States formally
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authorized by a unanimous vote "the use of armed forces" to carry out the
quarantine of Cuba. Apparently, one day later the blockade went into effect.
Other notable dates include October 27, when the Defense Department
announced that 24 troop-carrier squadrons of the Air Force Reserve were
being recalled to active duty; October 28, when Premier Khrushchev in a
message to President Kennedy, announced he had ordered the dismantling of
Soviet missile bases in Cuba; November 11, when Deputy Secretary of De-
fense Gilpatric announced the United States had counted 42 medium-range
missiles being removed from Cuba on Soviet ships; and November 20, when
President Kennedy announced he had ordered the lifting of the naval block-
ade.
On December 6, U. S. Navy planes verified that 42 Soviet jet bombers
were being transported home from Cuba. The United States apparently closed
the book on the Cuban crisis about this date. LRS, I, 24-25; and LRS, II, 1-18.
1963: Haiti.
On May 4, a Marine battalion was positioned off the coast of Haiti for five
days when trouble developed in that country. USMC, 111, 61.
1964: Congo.
In August, the United States sent four C-130 transport planes with ap-
proximately 100 flight and maintenance crews and paratroopers to protect the
aircraft while on the ground. The purpose was said to be to provide airlift for
the regular Congolese troops to combat areas during a rebellion against the
government of Premier Tshomb6 and President Kasavubu. Earlier, in July,
the United States had sent 68 officers and men to Leopoldville to advise the
Congolese army. Both actions followed the withdrawal on June 30 of the
last of the 20,000-man force which the United Nations had placed in the
Congo in order to keep the peace.
Subsequently, in November, rebels in the Stanleyville area held over a
thousand foreign civilian hostages, including 60 Americans, who were subjected
to many atrocities and whom the rebels threatened to kill. When negotiations
between the rebels and the United States failed, the United States and Belgium
arranged to land Belgian paratroopers to undertake a humanitarian rescue
operation.
On November 24, the force was airdropped by U. S. transport aircraft
in the Stanleyville area and liberated most of the hostages. Belgian paratroopers
undertook a second rescue operation on November 26, capturing the rebel
town of Paulis. In all, about 2,000 foreigners were rescued. President Johnson
assumed "full responsibility" for the United States role in the decision to
transport the Belgian troops in American planes. Davids, 296-310.
1964-1971: Armed Actions in Laos.
At the request of the Laotian Government, unarmed United States jet
planes began flying reconnaissance missions over the Plaine des Jarres in
May, 1964, in order to gather information on rebellious forces headed by
leftist Pathet Lao. After two jets were shot down on June 6 and 7, President
Johnson decided to carry out a limited reprisal. On June 9, U. S. Navy jets
attacked a Communist gun position in north central Laos, and this was
followed by 36 "sorties" which knocked out a number of Communist posts.
The United States has continued to play a role of air support in Laos to date.
State, 30.
1964-1971: Armed Action in Vietnam.
Following the Geneva Accords of 1954 which provisionally divided
Vietnam at approximately the 17th parallel, the Communists held control
of the northern half of the country while anti-Communists maintained a
precarious hold on the south. A U. S. Military Assistance Advisory Group,
which assumed responsibility for the training of the South Vietnamese army
after the French relinquished command, was steadily expanded as Communist
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guerrilla activity supported and directed from the north intensified. By 1962,
there were 12,000 U. S. advisors.
In August, 1964, at the request of President Johnson following an
attack on American naval vessels in the Gulf of Tonkin, Congress passed the
Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, unanimously in the House and by a vote of 88-2
in the Senate. The Resolution expressed approval and support of "the deter-
mination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary
measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and
to prevent further aggression." Also it provided the United States is "prepared
as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use
of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia
Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom."
(South Vietnam is a protocol state of SEATO). The joint resolution was
signed into law on August 10 as Public Law 88-408.
Both this resolution and the SEATO agreement itself have been claimed
as authority for United States activities in Vietnam. In addition, several
appropriations laws providing for support of the hostilities in Southeast Asia
are purported to represent authority for our engagement there. The Tonkin
Gulf Resolution was subsequently repealed by P. L. 91-672 (Jan. 12, 1971).
Since assuming office in January, 1969, President Nixon has ordered the
withdrawal of 364,000 troops. The latest reduction will lower the total of
American military forces in South Vietnam to 184,000 by December, 1971.
State, 12-14.
1965: Dominican Republic.
A revolt broke out in the Dominican Republic on April 24, 1965, and on
April 28 President Johnson announced that Dominican military authorities
had requested assistance from the United States in protecting the lives of
United States citizens living in that country. The President added that he
had ordered the Secretary of Defense to put the necessary troops ashore
to protect Americans, and that this assistance would be available to the
nationals of other countries as well.
The first United States military contingent to the Dominican Republic
consisted of 400 men. On May 2, the President announced that he was
sending 200 more men immediately and that an additional 4,500 would go
at the earliest possible moment. He cited the increasing Communist control
of the revolutionaries, as well as the urgent need for food, medical supplies,
and other humanitarian assistance to the Dominican people, as reasons for
his decision. At their peak, 21,500 United States troops were in the DominicanRepublic.On May 5, a five-man OAS peace commission succeeded in achieving a
cease-fire agreement among the contending forces, and on May 6, the OAS
voted to create an Inter-American Peace Force to assist in restoring peace
and order. The arrival on May 21 of the first contingent of a Brazilian force
permitted the withdrawal of 1,700 United States troops, and as other foreign
contingents arrived, additional United States troops were withdrawn. By the
end of 1965, the Inter-American Peace Force totaled 9,400. In the mean-
time, a formula to restore constitutional government, worked out by an OAS
Ad Hoc Commission, made considerable progress. The inauguration of a
civilian, Hector Garcia Godoy, as provisional president on September 3, 1965,
was a major step toward the restoration of stability. State, 14-15.
1967: Syrian Coast.
In June of 1967, during the Arab-Israeli War, President Johnson ordered
the U. S. 6th Fleet to move to within 50 miles of the Syrian Coast as a sign
to the Soviet Union it "would have to deal with us" if it entered the conflict.
The action was taken as a counter-move against the Soviet Union after
Premier Kosygin told President Johnson over the hotline that the Soviets "had
reached a decision that they were prepared to do what was necessary, including
using the military" to stop the advance of Israeli troops into Arab territory,
and would give the Israelis just five hours to halt their operations. Star, D-4.
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1967: Congo.
In July, Lt. General Mobutu, who had now become President of the
Congo, was challenged by a revolt of about 170 white mercenaries and a few
hundred Katangese troops. The Congolese army numbered around 32,000,
but required outside logistical support in order to crush the revolt.
Responding to a direct appeal from President Mobutu, on July 8 the
United States sent three C-130 military transport aircraft to the Congo, with
their crews, to provide the Central Government with "long-range logistical
support." Approximately 150 American military men arrived with the planes.
The small American task force immediately began to drop several plane
loads of paratroopers and their equipment and continued to fly troops until
November. On July 15, the first aircraft was withdrawn; on August 4, the
second; and on December, the last. LRS, III.
1970:3 Cambodia.
From April 30 to June 30, U. S. troops attacked Communist sanctuaries
in order to ensure the success of the program of Vietnamization. LRS, IV, 57.
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B. FIVE UNITED STATES MILITARY ACTIONS ABROAD
UNDER A DECLARATION OF WAR
War of 1812. (1812-1815)
On June 18, Congress approved a declaration of war against England.
The war was officially concluded by the Treaty of Chent, December 24, 1814,
but the major battle of the war occurred with an American victory at New
Orleans in January, 1815.
War Between the United States and Mexico. (1846-1848)
Congress declared war on May 11, 1846. The Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo ended the conflict on February 2, 1848.
Spanish-American War. (1898)
On April 25, 1898, the United States declared war against Spain. The
peace treaty ending hostilities was signed in Paris on December 10, 1898.
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World War I. (1917-1919)
The United States declared war on Germany on April 6, 1917, and against
Austria on December 7, 1917. The Treaty of Versailles was signed on June
28, 1919. The treaty was never ratified by the United States.
World War II. (1941-1945)
The United States declared war on Japan December 8, 1941, and on
Germany and Italy December 11, 1941. The war ended in Europe on May
8, 1945. Japan signed the formal surrender in Asia on September 2, 1945.
C. FORTY-THREE MAJOR MILITARY ACTIONS
FOR BROAD STRATEGIC AIMS
1798-1800: Naval War with France. The U. S. fought primarily for the
protection of its free commerce.
1801-1805: War with Tripoli. The U. S. upheld its right of free commerce.
1814-1825: Caribbean Area. The U. S. sunk or captured 65 vessels to protect
American commerce.
1815: Second Barbary War. The U. S. acted to provide effective
protection to American commerce.
1844: Mexico. President Tyler deployed our troops to protect Texas
one year before annexation.
1846: Mexico. President Polk ordered General Scott to occupy disputed
territory between the Nueces and the Rio Grande.
1853-1854: Japan. Commodore Perry's expedition of 2000 men and ten
ships advanced American commercial interests.
1864: Japan. U. S. Naval units participated in a joint effort to force
open the Straits of Shimonoseki for the free conduct of inter-
national commerce.
1865-1866: Mexican border. General Sheridan and 50,000 U. S. troops backed
up a demand from Secretary of State Seward that French forces
withdraw from Mexico.
1888-1889: Samoan Islands. Germany and the United States were close to
warfare due to their rivalry over naval privileges in the
Samoans.
1899-1901: Philippine Islands. The United States used 126,468 troops against
the Philippine Insurrection in order to preserve and foster any
rights it had acquired from Spain.
1900-1901: Boxer Rebellion (Peking). The U. S. sent 5000 troops and
marines to relieve foreign legations in Peking and to keep
open communication between Peking and the sea.
1903-1914: Panama. Marine guards landed and remained on the Isthmus
to protect construction.of the Canal.
1906-1909: Cuba. The U. S. temporarily occupied Cuba to preserve order.
1912: Cuba. American troops remained three months to preserve order.
1915-1934: Haiti. By force of arms U. S. troops took over Haiti in part to
forestall European intervention.
1916-1924: Dominican Republic. U. S. troops occupied Santo Domingo and
supported a military governor in the Dominican Republic.
1917: Armed Atlantic Merchant Ships. President Wilson armed Ameri-
can merchant vessels with guns and gunners assigned from the
Navy.
1917: Cuba. Several American landings were made to preserve order.
1918-1920: Expeditions to Russia. The U. S. contributed some 14,000 men
to aid the anti-Bolsheviks and to forestall Japanese expansionist
plans in Siberia.
60
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 74, Iss. 1 [1971], Art. 9
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol74/iss1/9
WAR POWERS LEGISLATION 113
1926-1933: Nicaragua. The occupation of Nicaragua foiled the first attempt
of Communism to infiltrate Latin America.
1927-1928: China. Nearly 6000 U. S. troops acted to help stabilize China.
1937-1938: China. Some 2500 marines helped preserve order in Shanghai
under the International Defense Scheme.
1940: British possessions in Western Atlantic. U. S. occupied military
bases on British soil to protect long range national security in-
terests.
1941: Greenland. The U. S. Army occupied Greenland for the same
reason as above.
1941: Iceland. U. S. troops occupied Iceland for the same reason
as above.
1941: Atlantic convoys. U. S. warships were used to convoy military
supplies to Britain and Russia.
1941: Dutch Guiana. American troops occupied Dutch Guiana for
same reason as above.
1946: Turkey. A U. S. carrier unit was deployed to affirm U. S. in-
tentions to shore up Turkey against Soviet imperialism.
1950-1953: Korean War. U. S. forces acted to assist the Republic of Korea
in order "to restore international peace and security in the
area.:
1957: Taiwan. U. S. naval units were dispatched to defend Taiwan.
1958: Lebanon. A primary purpose of using U. S. armed forces in
Lebanon was to assist Lebanon in preserving its political in-
dependence.
1961: Dominican Waters, U. S. Navy ships took up positions three miles
off the Dominican coast and Navy jet planes patrolled the
shoreline to prevent a revolution in the Dominican Republic.
1962: Thailand. Some 5000 marines landed to support Thailand during
a threat of external Communist aggression.
1962: Cuban Naval Quarantine. President Kennedy ordered a naval
quarantine of Cuba to prevent delivery of additional Russian
missiles and to obtain the removal of those already in Cuba.
1963: Haiti. A marine battalion was positioned off Haiti when trouble
developed there.
1964: Congo. A task force of four U. S. C-130 transport planes with
paratrooper guards was sent to the Congo to provide airlift for
the regular Congolese troops against a Communist-assisted
rebellion.
1964-1971: Vietnam. American forces have acted to support freedom and
protect peace in Southeast Asia.
1964-1971: Laos. The United States has supported the free government
of Laos, particularly with air missions.
1965: Dominican Republic. The threat of a Communist takeover and
the need to provide humanitarian assistance to the Dominican
people were major reasons for the American landings.
1967: Syrian Coast. During the Arab-Israeli war, the U. S. 6th Fleet
moved to within 50 miles of the Syrian Coast as a sign to the
Soviet Union it "would have to deal with us" if it entered the
conflict.
1967: Congo. A task force of three U. S. C-130 transports and 150
men ferried Congolese paratroopers in order to crush a revolt
against Mobutu's government.
1970: Cambodia. U. S. troops were ordered into Cambodia to assist
the program of Vietnamization.
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D. EIGHTY-ONE HOSTILITIES wr= ACTUAL
COMBAT OR ULTIMATUMS
1798-1800: Quasi-war with France
1800: West Indies
1801-1805: War with Tripoli
1806: Mexico
1806-1810: Gulf of Mexico
1814-1825: Caribbean area
1815: Second Barbary War
1816-1818: Spanish Florida
1817: Amelia Island (Spanish Territory)
1820: West Africa


















1851: Turkey (Apparently no shots fired, but the force displayed
amounted to a compulsory ultimatum)
1851: Johanna Island (East of Africa)
1953: China
1853: West Coast of Africa
1853-1854: Japan (Commodore Perry's expedition including 10 ships and
2000 men conveyed an imminent threat of force.)
1854: China
1954: Greytown, Nicaragua









1859: Paraguay (The Naval display of force amounted to compulsion.)
1863: Japan
1864: Japan
1865-1866: Mexico border (General Sheridan and 50,000 American troops
backed up the demand of Secretary of State Seward that





1888: Haiti (American Commander issued an ultimatum threatening
force if necessary.)
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1888-1889: Samoan Islands (Three powers had warships on the scene during
an intense rivalry over claims in the islands. War was close




1900-1901: Boxer Rebellion (China)
1899-1901: Philippine Insurrection
1910: Nicaragua (Armed combat was "hourly expected.")
1911: Honduras (The American Commander expressly threatened to
use force if necessary.)
1914: Dominican Republic
1914: Occupation of Vera Cruz, Mexico
1915: Haiti
1916: Dominican Republic
1916-1917: Pershing Expedition into Mexico
1917: Armed Atlantic merchant ships
1918-1919: Mexico
1918-1920: Expeditions to Russia
1926-1933: Nicaraguan occupation





1962: Cuban naval quarantine





E. NINETY-THREE MILITARY ACTIONS
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F. ONE HUNDRED MILITARY ACTIONS BY THE UNITED STATES
























































































































































































































G. EIGHTY-ONE MILITARY OPERATIONS ARGUABLY INITIATED






















































































I Indicates operation occurred under Act of 1819 or Treaty of August 9,
1842, with Great Britain, both relative to the suppression of slavery.
S2 Indicates military activity may have occurred pursuant to broad interpre-
tation of authority conferred by certain Acts of Congress against piracy. See
Act of March 3, 1819 (3 Stat. 510), Act of January 14, 1823 (3 Stat 720),
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3 Though reliance was also placed on the U. N. Charter, the Truman
Administration based its authority to commit troops squarely on the President's
independent Constitutional authority. Rogers, discussion supra, note 55, at
S7197.
4 In fact President Eisenhower sent troops into Lebanon without seeking
specific Congressional approval and without specifically basing has authority





























Vera Cruz, Mexico X
China











































5 According to Secretary of State Rogers, "the Cuban Resolution, unlike
the other area resolutions, contained no grant of authority to the President."
Id.
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